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INTRODUCTION

The American financial services industry employs innumerable intermediaries working for investors and savers, such as accountants, advisors, agents, bankers, brokers, consultants, directors, funds, lawyers, managers, and rating agencies. They charge
considerable fees to facilitate exchanges by easing searches and
synthesizing or validating complex information. Their influence
has been studied from numerous perspectives, including behavioral finance,1 industrial economics,2 and public-choice theory.3
Such treatments illuminate why financial intermediaries exist,
what value they add, and what costs they impose, from the perspective of how clients act, how market structures work, and how
laws and policies are formulated.
To this substantial literature comes a welcome supplement'
Intermediary Influence' thanks to Professor Kathryn J udge.
Providing a singular account of intermediary influence as a
source of sustained pricing power, Judge's article warns of excessive transaction costs, a net direct loss to the constituents of intermediaries (on both sides), and an indirect net social loss. 4 Such

6 Henry St. George Tucker III Research Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.
1 See generally, for example, Ronald J. Gilson and] effrey N. Gordon, The Agency
Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Corporate Governance Rights, 113 Colum L Rev 863 (2013).
2
See generally, for example, Rosemary L. Batt and Eileen Appelbaum, The Impact
of Financialization on Management and Employment Outcomes (Upjohn Institute, Feb
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/ACG5-QL 56.
3
See generally, for example, J ohn C. Coffee J r, The Political Economy of DoddFrank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97
Cornell L Rev 1019 (2012).
4
Kathryn] udge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U Chi L Rev 573, 624'30 (2015).
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an outcome is in tension with prevailing thought in microeconomics, which prescribes and predicts that market forces spontaneously and inexorably pressure for transaction cost minimization.s
After all, as Professor Ronald Coasetaught nearly a century ago,
rational economic actors will self-rely when the costs of intermediation exceed the gains. This is the rationale for the existence of
firms: they organize economic activity.6
Economists dating to the writing of Coase's seminal work,
The Nature of the Firm, assume that institutional arrangements
evolve to minimize transaction costs, yet J udge highlights how
the influence of financial intermediaries often produces persistently high transaction costs. Her intuition is that contemporary
transaction costs are heavy with fees charged by intermediaries
who seek to maximize economic gain in settings in which their
expertise and positions enable them to promote institutional arrangements that yield high fees despite the existence of lowercost alternatives.7 judge uses examples from several contexts'
those of real estate agents, 8 stockbrokers9 mutual funds,o and
stock exchanges "' to illustrate how intermediary influence is accumulated and wielded. While acknowledging that financial intermediaries often add value and earn fees commensurate with
benefits, Judge simultaneously explains how the phenomenon of
intermediary influence should be incorporated into theories of
economic behavior and explores how market participants and policymakers might respond in high-fee environments.12 Among the
various important responses are competitive and regulatory tools
that increase transparency, enabling participants to shop comparatively in order to avoid excessive fees.13
5 See Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew L. Spitzer, The Enduring Power of Coase, 54
J L & Econ S63, S64 (2011) (stating that -almost every field of economics and political
science is shaped by Coasean insights:). See also generallyj ason Scott] ohnston, TheInfluenceofTheNatureoftheFirm ontheTheoryofCorporateLaw, 18J CorpL 213 (1993)
(examining the widespread influence and adoption of transaction cost theory in the field
of corporate law). But see Anoop Madhok, Reassessing the Fundamentals and Beyond:
Ronald Coase, theTransaction Cost and Resource-Based Theories of the Firm and theInstitutional Structure of Production, 23 Strategic MgmtJ 535, 535'36 (2002) (analyzing a
resource-based theory of firm activity in tension with transaction cost'minimization theory).
6
See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386, 390'98 (1937).
7 J udge, 82 U Chi L Rev at 589'90 (cited in note 4).
8 See id at 583'88.
9 See id at 600'01.
10 See id at 602'10.
11 Seej udge, 82 U Chi L Rev at 598'600 (cited in note 4).
12 See id at 635'42.
13 See id at 638.
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In this Essay, I offer an additional context' the acquisitions
market' in which intermediary influence manifests itself, yet is
accompanied by potential competitive and regulatory pressures of
the kind thatj udge envisions constraining excessive fees. In this
market, acquirers are diverse, and they include financial bidders
such as private equity firms as well as strategic buyers like rivals
in similar sectors and diversifying conglomerates. These acquirers' propensities to use intermediaries and generate costs vary:
many incur significant and frequent fees, while others eschew
them. Sellers of businesses' and others affected by the acquisition process, including shareholders, lenders, employees, and
other stakeholders' face radically different cost structures.
The acquisition industry is characterized by the traits that,
as Judge shows, typify intermediary influence: transaction constituents are often one-time players who rely heavily on acquisition intermediaries.14 These intermediaries are in turn repeat
players in oligopolistic markets who engineer complex, opaque
transactions that require specialized knowledge.15 But the industry is not limited to intermediaries wielding influence and earning high fees; it also includes rivals who keep costs low. This Essay highlights two powerhouses representing opposite ends of the
spectrum of financial intermediation: Berkshire Hathaway, the
conglomerate built by Warren Buffett that eschews financial intermediation, and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KK R), the pioneering
private equity firm that thrives on such intermediation. The juxtaposition illustrates both the intermediary influence thatj udge
describes and the efficacy of her prescription to counter it with
transparent low-cost rivals.
After presenting this comparison and drawing related implications, this Essay offers broader reflections on J udge's work,
principally by posing four questions: How much should we expect
financial intermediaries' fees to decline due to technological advances in light of countervailing factors such as globalization and
complexity that may sustain high fees? Is it feasible to distinguish
the influence on institutional arrangements of specific intermediaries from the influence and effects of other participants? Is intermediary influence invariably exerted primarily to benefit intermediaries or instead to aid producers or even consumers? And
can the causal arrow be discerned' that is, is it clear that certain

See id at 614'16.
15 Seej udge, 82U Chi L Rev at 618'20 (cited in note4).
14
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institutional arrangements exist because of intermediary influence, or might institutional arrangements such as oligopolistic industry structures cause the influence? This Essay stresses that,
far from constituting criticism of Judge's work, such questions
warrant further research precisely because her work is so important and fruitful.
I. THE PROMISE OF LOW-COST RIVALS
A Wall Street saying quips that while transactions generate
fees, fees often generate transactions. An acute example occurs
when a company is encouraged to make an acquisition to diversify
and gain synergies, only to be later encouraged to divest the business to unify focus and to shed the shackles of bureaucracy. In the
world of private equity epitomized by KK R, it is common to see
the same company bought and sold multiple times over a decade
or so, generating considerable repeat fees for the intermediaries
who design and administer such transactions.16 While conglomerates someti mes follow the buy-and-fli p approach, strategic buyers
(and Berkshire, to a fault) generally prefer a buy-and-hold route
with fewer intermediaries and lower costs.

17 As

competitors in the

acquisitions market, it should be possible for Berkshire and other
strategic buyers to dampen the fees of K KR and other private equity firms, at least if there are enough participants and if fees are
disclosed for scrutiny. Neither condition currently prevails, but
policy might be nudged in those directions.
A. Anti-intermediation: Berkshire Hathaway

8

Berkshire' a fifty-year-old conglomerate under Buffett's
leadership and now America's third-largest public company' almost never uses intermediaries. Despite its stock being very
16 See Steven N. Kaplan and Per StrOnberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity,
23J Econ Persp 121, 129 (2009) (finding that secondary buyouts:' sales from one private
equity firm to another" are the second-most common investment-exit method).
17 See George P. Baker and George David Smith, The New Financial Capitalists:
KohlbergKravis Roberts and theCreation of CorporateValue 168 (Cambridge 1998) ( The
documented behavior of successful conglomerates shows that they tended to be opportunistic buyers but reluctant sellers of companies. So long as constituent business units continued to meet minimal corporate performance criteria, they were unlikely to be sold.:).
18 For additional analysis of Berkshire, see generally Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Berkshire's Disintermediation: Buffett's New Managerial Model, 50 Wake Forest L Rev
(forthcoming 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/N5RJ -Q2E R (examining Berkshire's antiintermediation policies and suggesting that these policies may shape future generations
of similar firms); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Berkshire beyond Buffett: The Enduring
Value of Values (Columbia 2014) (examining how Berkshire's distinctive corporate culture
informs its success). See also generally Lawrence Cunningham, Minus the Middleman:

http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev_online/vol82/iss1/13

4

Cunninghame: Intermediary Influence and Competition: Berkshire versus KKR

2015]

Intermediary Influenceand Competition

widely held and its market capitalization nearing half a trillion
dollars,19 Berkshire has scarcely borrowed money; 2o despite being
built through the serial acquisition of some seventy subsidiaries
over fifty years, 21 Berkshire has rarely hired a business broker;22
and despite employing nearly 350,000 people,23 it hardly ever uses
consultants of any kind.24 As Berkshire's vice chairman, Charlie
Munger, once explained to me, the company follows these practices because it takes Professor Coase seriously. Why others don't
is likely due toa combination of factors, including managerial interests (agency costs), the allure of debt, and legal pressures to
reduce liability risk' and also due to intermediary influence.
While American companies borrow heavily to boost returns
and gain tax advantages,25 Berkshire shuns debt as costly and
constraining, preferring to rely on itself and use its own money. 26
It generates abundant earnings and retains 100 percent of
them'

it has not paid a dividend in nearly fifty years. 27 In 2014,

Berkshire's net worth grew by $18.3 billion' all of which was
available for reinvestment28 Its time horizon is forever because it
commits to owning its subsidiaries indefinitely' a promise
backed by a record of not selling a single one in forty years.

29

Berkshire Model Offers Profitable Lessons (Omaha World-Herald, May 2, 2015), archived
at http://perma.cc/R7WS-GKEE; LawrenceA. Cunningham, The Philosophy of Warren E.
Buffett (NY Times, May 1, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/H7BP-Q285.
19 See Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Cl A (MarketWatch, Sept 11, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/5VSA-KXT6.
20 SeeCunningham, 50WakeForest L Rev at *9'10 (cited in note 18).
21 Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: 2014 Annual Report *125 (Warren E. Buffett, 2015)
(_Berkshire 2014 Report:), archived at http://perma.cc/ASM9-BLUZ.
22 Cunningham, Berkshire beyond Buffett at 213 (cited in note 18).
23 Berkshire 2014 Report at *125 (cited in note 21).
24
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Buffett's and Berkshire's Anti -bureaucracy (Columbia
Law School, June 17, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/636E -X8GL.
25 See generallyJ ohn R. Graham, How Big Are the Tax Benefits of Debt?, 55J Fin
1901 (2000). But see generallyJ ennifer Blouin, J ohn E. Core, and Wayne Guay, Havethe
Tax Benefits of Debt Been Overestimated?, 98J Fin Econ 195 (2010).
26 See Berkshire 2014 Report at *118 (cited in note 21) (We use debt sparingly and,
when we do borrow, we attempt tostructure our loans on a long-term fixed-rate basis. We
will reject interesting opportunities rather than over-leverage our balance sheet.:). But
see id at *113 (We also issue debt in the ordinary course of business to fund business
operations, business acquisitions and for other general purposes.:).
27 See Cunningham, 50Wake Forest L Rev at *7 (cited in note 18). See also Berkshire
2014 Report at *124 (cited in note 21).
28 Berkshire2014 Report at *3 (cited in note 21).
29 Cunningham, The Philosophy of Warren E. Buffett (cited in note 18) (_Unique
among its rivals in the acquisition market, Berkshire has not sold a subsidiary in 40 years,
and pledges not to do so unless a business is doomed.:); Berkshire 2014 Report at *119
(cited in note 21):
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Thanks to its long time horizon, Berkshire's deferred taxes total
over $60 bill ion.3o T hese amount to interest-free government loans
without covenants.
The principal leverage at Berkshire is insurance float.31 This
refers to funds that arise because Berkshire receives premiums
up front but need not pay claims until later, if it all.32 Provided
that insurance is underwritten with discipline, float is akin to borrowed money but cheaper, and it comes without due dates or covenants. 33 At Berkshire, float now totals $84 billion, which is used
to buy businesses that continue to multiply Berkshire's value.34
All these sources of funds can be transferred among Berkshire subsidiaries, so those with excess cash support those with
capital needs' all tax free and without the frictional costs of
debt.35 Berkshire and its subsidiaries become self-reliant, selfdisciplining financing machines. (Two of Berkshire's capitalintensive subsidiaries, a railroad and a public utility, borrow significant sums, but none of their debt is guaranteed by Berkshire.)36
American corporations rely heavily on intermediaries, such as
business brokers and investment bankers, who charge fees and
have incentives to get deals done; firms also use accountants, consultants, and lawyers to conduct due diligence before closing. Berkshire rarely uses bankers or brokers, and it does limited due diligence. 37 Instead, Berkshire relies on a network of relationships,
including previous sellers of businesses.38 Buffett is self-reliant,
Regardless of price, we have no interest at all in selling any good businesses that
Berkshire owns. We are alsovery reluctant tosell sub-par businesses as long as
we expect them to generate at least some cash and as long as we feel good about
their managers and labor relations.
30 Berkshire2014 Report at *72 (cited in note 21).
31 Andrea Frazzini, David Kabiller, and Lasse H. Pedersen, Buffett's Alpha *11 '12
(National Bureau of Economic Research, Nov 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/82J U
-DHF8 (identifying Berkshire Hathaway's -two main liabilities [as] debt and insurance
float ... [with] 36% of Berkshire's liabilities consist[ing] of insurance float on average:).
32 See id at*12.
33 Berkshire 2014 Report at *119 (cited in note 21).
34 Id at *8.
35 See Cunningham, 50 Wake Forest L Rev at *10"11 (cited in note 18).
36 See id at *10 n 38 (identifying Burlington Northern Santa Fe and Berkshire H athaway Energy together as accounting for $55 billion of Berkshire's $74 billion total debt);
Berkshire 2014 Report at *12 (cited in note 21).
37 See Lawrence Cunningham, Cunningham: Why Don't More Companies Copy the
Berkshire Model? (Omaha World-Herald, May 2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/RJ 69
-3V5Q; Cunningham, 50 Wake Forest L Rev at *12'13 (cited in note 18) (providing examples of Berkshire's limited use of intermediaries in its acquisitions).
38 See Robert E. Miles, TheWarren Buffett CEO: Secrets from the Berkshire Hathaway Managers 344 (Wiley 2002).
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thanks to gargantuan reading that gives him broad business
knowledge and an investment philosophy that values companies
based on old-fashioned business analysis rather than marketbased proxies such as price-earnings multiples.39
Most acquirers of businesses promptly implement operational changes and related engineering to integrate a business,
find synergies, and cut costs. Berkshire acquires only companies
for which no such changes are needed, and it never pursues such
a strategy.40
Indeed, contrary tothe practice at most sizableAmerican corporations, Berkshire has no centralized procedures or departments, no hierarchies for reporting or budgeting, and no middle
managers. 41 All such functions are handled in the company's individual units. In fact, Berkshire headquarters employs just
twenty-five people.42 And Berkshire gives the CE Os of its subsidiaries almost unbridled discretion over operations.43 Once a year,
Buffett sends them the same one-page letter with six broad mandates on it, such as -protect Berkshire's reputation: and -report
bad news early.: 44 -Many speak to Buffett only once a year' others less often.: 45
Today, corporate America's boards are intermediaries between shareholders and management. 46 Directors are monitors
involved in specific strategic decisionmaking. 47 They meet
monthly, using many committees, 48 which in turn hire accountants, consultants, and lawyers. American directors are well paid,
averaging salaries of $263,748 annually' including considerable
See id at 342.
See Berkshire 2014 Report at *40 (cited in note 21) (describing the Berkshire acquisition policy as _seek[ing] to pay a fair price for a good business that the Chairman
could pretty well understand:). The rare exceptions occurred early in Buffett's career, such
as the 1977 acquisition of The Buffalo News, which faced considerable competitive pressure. See Miles, The Warren Buffett CE 0 at 235 (cited in note 38).
41
See Berkshire 2014 Report at *86 (cited in note 21).
42 1d at*6, 125.
43 See Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: 2009 Annual Report *5 (Warren E. Buffett, 2010),
archived at http://perma.cc/9FVJ -8KW8 (-We tend to let our many subsidiaries operate on
their own, without our supervising and monitoring them to any degree.:).
44 Cunningham, 50 Wake Forest L Rev at *9 (cited in note 18).
45 Cunningham, Buffett's and Berkshire's Anti-bureaucracy (cited in note 24). See
also Miles, TheWarren Buffett CEO at vi (cited in note 38) ( Warren's CEOs do not have
to call Omaha daily or provide weekly reports.... Of course, most of them want to talk to
Buffett and check in periodically. But they don't have to.:).
46 See J effrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States,
1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 Stan L Rev 1465,
1468 (2007).
47 See id at 1506.
48 See id at 1490'94.
39

40
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stock compensation and company-purchased liability insurance.49
Berkshire's board, in contrast, follows the old-fashioned advisory
model: It comprises friends and family, who are directors because
they are interested in Berkshire.so They do not oversee management, but rather provide support and advice. There are few committees, no hired advisors, and only two or three meetings per
year. 51 Berkshire pays its directors essentially nothing and provides no insurance.2 But Berkshire's directors are significant
shareholders, each of whom bought the stock with their own
cash.53
As Professor] udge notes, most American corporate equity is
owned by large financial intermediaries such as mutual funds,
hedge funds, and pension funds. 54 Stock trading is frequent and
portfolios are regularly rebalanced tomaintain diversification. As
J udge observes, this generates significant fees for intermediaries
as well as frictional costs for investors.ss Most of Berkshire's
shareholders either own the stock directly' individuals, families,
and family offices' or hold it through family-oriented firms that
concentrate in Berkshire stock.56 Berkshire's share turnover is
low and Berkshire stock is many shareholders' largest holding.s7
All this minimizes the role and costs of intermediaries, from
stockbrokers to exchanges.
Corporations are hierarchies, with shareholders owning a residual claim on firm assets in the form of an equity stake after
liabilities are covered by assets. That inherent separation of ownership from control provides a fertile environment for financial
intermediaries toflourish.58 In contrast, Buffett defines Berkshire
49 See 2014 Spencer Stuart Board Index *35 (Spencer Stuart, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/8L 5J -4P SZ.
50 See Andrew Kilpatrick, Of Permanent Value: The Story of Warren Buffett 164
(McGraw-Hill rev ed 1998) (_Berkshire's board is small, family-oriented and has no real
outside directors.:).
51 See id at 163 ( In keeping with its lean structure carefully devised by Buffett, there
are only seven directors on the board, which has no standing committees and gets little in
the way of outside advice.:).
52 See Berkshire 2014 Report at *36 (cited in note 21) (describing Berkshire's directors' fees as -token: and claiming that Berkshire carries _nodirectors and officers liability
insurance:).

53

See id.

j udge, 82 U Chi L Rev at 602 (cited in note 4) (noting that institutional investors
owned more than _76 percent of the outstanding equity for the 1,000 largest corporations:).
55 Id at 605'06.
56 See Cunningham, 50 Wake Forest L Rev at *6 (cited in note 18).
57 See Cunningham, Berkshire beyond Buffett at 37 (cited in note 18).
58 SeeJ ill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership from
Control, 33 Seattle U L Rev 877, 879'84 (2010).
54
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as a partnership, declaring from the outset: _Although our form
is corporate, our attitude is partnership.:59 This is a legacy from
Buffett's start: he was running a partnership that, in 1965, acquired Berkshire, which then began acquiring other companies
en route to becoming the galactic corporation that it is today.6o

Buffett retained that partnership spirit, a profound disintermediation that views the corporation as a conduit through which
shareholders own its assets and not merely an equity stake.61
Such conceptions arethe polar opposite tothe chain of intermediation in many contemporary financial sectors that J udge
criticizes.62

Most corporate boards set their dividend policies to follow a
regular periodic amount invariant to business conditions and to
split the stock when price exceeds an affordable trading range, in
order to keep shareholders interested in trading it.63 Berkshire's
dividend policy varies with corporate ability to reinvest earnings
profitably, which has meant no dividends since 1969; it has polled
shareholders on whether they approve of this policy (they do).64 It

does not split the stock to keep the price low. On the contrary,
consider a spectacular example of Berkshire's antiintermediation policy: In 1996, when Berkshire's stock traded at
$34,900, two money managers designed a unit trust that would
buy the stock and issuefractional units designed to trade at a low
price. They would charge fees for this service that would draw
new traders to Berkshire, increasing transaction costs. To knock
out these middlemen, Berkshire amended its charter to rename
its existing common stock as Class A and add a Class B with fractional rights.65 It vowed to offer as many shares as necessary to
66
fill orders' which it did, killing demand for the unit trust.

Berkshire's savings from omitting the middleman include the
direct costs of fees and interest plus the vastly larger indirect
costs of relying on advisors whose incentives are to encourage
more action' more debt, deals, trading, services, and fees. While
Buffett and Munger are responsible for much of this practice, it
Berkshire2014 Report at *36 (cited in note 21).
See id at *24'28.
61 See id at *117.
62 SeeJ udge, 82 U Chi L Rev at 624'30 (cited in note4).
63 See Cunningham, 50 Wake Forest L Rev at *7 (cited in note 18).
64 See Berkshire 2014 Report at *38 (cited in note 21) (describing a tally of proxy votes
in which 98 percent of the shares represented voted to keep the no-dividend policy).
65
Robert W. Hamilton, Reflections on the Pricing of Shares, 19 Cardozo L Rev 493,
500"01 (1997).
66 See id at 503.
59
60
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has been internalized across the institution and is likely to endure
after successors assume control.67 The more interesting question
is not whether such habits can endure at Berkshire but rather
why they are not more widely practiced.J udge is right to explain
that intermediary influence is a factor' consequently, public policy should be designed to encourage proliferation of the Berkshire
model.
B. Prointermediation: Kohlberg Kravis Roberts
KKR' a forty-year-old leveraged buyout firm and the historical driving force behind today's massive private equity industry' is both an intermediary and a progenitor of intermediaries.68
Its business model and philosophy are at the other end ofthespectrum from those of Berkshire in nearly every important way. Having arranged for the purchase and sale of thousands of companies,
it has structured mountains of debt, generated enormous fees
from merger advisory services in thousands of transactions, and
reaped additional gains from innumerable advisory and consulting services.69
KKR's business model involves creating a series of separate
funds that buy, run, and sell a discrete number of individual companies, relying throughout on massive borrowing.70 A typical fund
deal is financed with at least 70 percent debt.71 Moreover, virtually all equity' all but 1 to 5 percent' is staked not by the firm
but by outside investors and solicited in private placements facilitated by intermediaries, including pension plans, university endowments, sovereign wealth funds, banks, and insurance companies.72 In form, funds are dubbed -partnerships,: with K KR as the
general partner and each such equity investor a limited partner;

Cunningham, Minus the Middleman (cited in note 18).
See Eileen Appelbaum and Rosemary Batt, Private Equity at Work: When Wall
Street Manages Main Street 21 '24 (Russell Sage 2014).
69 See id at 24'27.
70 Baker and Smith, The New Financial Capitalists at 168'69 (cited in note 17).
71 Appelbaum and Batt, Private Equity at Work at 2 (cited in note 68).
72 See Matthew D. Kain, Stephen B. McKeon, and Steven Davidoff Solomon, Intermediation in Private Equity: The Role of Placement Agents *15, 35 (unpublished manuscript, May 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/6S9E-TZKQ (analyzing the common categories of external investors); Ryan Kantor and Ryan Sullivan, A Lawyers Guide: Valuation
Issues in Private Equity Funds *2 (unpublished manuscript, Dec 6, 2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/9SB3-L9U B (placing the amount of investment capital provided by private
equity managers between 1 and 5 percent).
67
68
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but the attitude is hierarchical, with the general partner calling
all the shots in a setting rife with conflicts of interest.73
As general partner, KKR is less an investor than a multiline
intermediary. As an intermediary, KKR collects 2 percent of investors' equity through a -management fee,: plus 20 percent of
the return on investment abovea hurdle rate(typically 8 percent),
which is dubbed _carried interest.: 74 In addition, the intermediary
can levy extensive fees for a widevariety of activities that it might
engineer, such as board service on acquired companies, strategic
consulting, executive search, merger advice, or arrangement of
debt financing. 75 Intermediary influence in such settings is enormous and essentially uncheckable, with the press being among
6
the few bulwarks against excess. 7
KKR's time horizon for deals is short- or medium-term, not
long-term' and never indefinite. Rather, purchases and subsequent steps are all conducted with a focus on exiting by maximizing profits and minimizing duration. 77 Purchases are not made
without an exit strategy' ideally a premium-priced public offering orchestrated by the intermediary or an arranged sale to a
strategic buyer or another financial buyer.78 As with most other
activities that K KR conducts on behalf of the funds and companies it buys, the firm charges fees for making such arrangements. 79 When buying and selling, KKR and other private equity
firms favor formal valuation models, such as earnings multiples,

73 See Kantor and Sullivan, A Lawyers Guide at *2'4 (cited in note 72) (noting that
_[i]nvestors don't participate at all in the management of the fund,: and that _[t]here are
certain inherent and potential conflicts of interest between the funds sponsor on one hand
and the fund and investors on the other:).
74 David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94 Va L
Rev 715, 721 '23 (2008).
75 See Andrew Metrick and AyakoYasuda, The Economics of Private Equity Funds,
23 Rev Fin Stud 2303, 2314 (2010).
76 See, for example, Gretchen Morgenson, The Deal's Done. But Not the Fees (NY
Times, May 24, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4N DG-MVX5 (highlighting the high fees
obtained by private equity firms, some of which have been described as -undetectable by
even the most sophisticated investor,: and serving as an example of the press's ability to
shed light on these types of arrangements).
77 See Guy Fraser-Sampson, Private Equity as an Asset Class 9'11 (Wiley 2007) (discussing the limited nature of a private equity fund's investments).
78 See Kaplan and Str~nberg, 23J Econ Persp at 129 (cited in note 16) (showing
public offerings and sales tostrategic buyers or other financial buyers as the most common
exits).
79 See id at 124.
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rather than traditional business analysis of the kind that Berkshire and other long-term investors apply.8o
Operational change is usually part of every takeover plan.
While KKR and other leveraged buyout operators may look for
incumbent managers to remain in place, weak management is often blamed for a target's struggles, and the takeover includes reshuffling or replacing the management. 81 In every case, intervention is deep, as the intermediary provides close direction to
managers to execute the plan and conducts careful monitoring to
ensure execution.82 Cost reductions are often part of the plan,
meaning that the intermediary directs not only management
changes but also plant closings, layoffs, research and development cuts, product terminations, pension reductions, and other
radical business surgeries with clear-cut short-term gains.83 The
long-term prudence of such steps is generally not considered.8
Financial engineering is at the heart of many KK R deals, all
involving substantial and costly intermediation. 85 Often pejoratively dubbed asset stripping,: standard examples are saleleaseback arrangements 86 and dividend recapitalizations.87 T hese
transactions are designed and implemented by numerous intermediaries operating between the company and investors' intermediaries such as the general partner, leasing agents, lessees,

80 Fraser-Sampson, PrivateEquity as an Asset Class at 192'93 (cited in note77) (describing how buyout firms perform _full financial due diligence . . . includ[ing] commissioning a report from an investigating accountant:).
81 SeeKaplan andStrOnberg, 23J Econ Perspat 131 '32(cited in note 16)(_[P]rivate
equity investors do not hesitate to replace poorly performing management.... [Olne-third
of chief executive officers of these firms are replaced in the first 100 days while two-thirds
are replaced at some point over a four-year period.:).
82 See id at 131 (_[P]rivate equity investors control the boards of their portfolio companies and are more actively involved in governance than public company boards.:).
83 See id at 132:
Private-equity firms use their industry and operating knowledge to identify attractive investments, to develop value creation plans for those investments, and
to implement the value creation plans. A plan might include elements of costcutting opportunities and productivity improvements, strategic changes or repositioning, acquisition opportunities, as well as management changes and
upgrades.
84 See id at 133 (discussing the possibility that the changes implemented by the buyers prioritize short-term over long-term returns).
85 See Baker and Smith, The New Financial Capitalists at 169 (cited in note 17).
86 See Appelbaum and Batt, Private E quity at Work at 71 '72 (cited in note 68) (describing sale-leaseback arrangements as _sell[ing] the property [of the] company, return[ing] the proceeds to the PE investors, and then requir[ing] the portfolio company to
lease back and pay rent on the property it used to own:).
87 Id at 68'71, 286'87.
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and all their agents (including accountants, bankers, and lawyers).88 Each receives compensation for services, the most substantial of which goes tothe chief intermediary: the general partner. 89 In the process, moreover, costs are borne by other
constituents of the portfolio companies' including employees,
suppliers, customers, communities, and creditors, who are
unrepresented by intermediaries. 90
Since KKR is more an intermediary than an investor, it is
inclined toward greater risk taking than an investor would tolerate. High leverage is appealing because the rewards from boosting returns on equity can be considerable, while excessive debt
that leads to bankruptcy inflicts little pain.91 Whether a company

prospers or fails, K KR earns fees for itself and generates fees and
interest for other intermediaries, including financial institutions
that participate in the process of designing and marketing costly
debt.92

KKR's intermediary influence is considerable. For example,
along with other industry titans, it effected important vocabulary
changes commonly used to describe the industry and its principal
fuel: the pejorative label junk bonds: has been successfully replaced with the congenial term high-yield bonds,: 93 and the term
-leveraged buyout operator: has been changed to -private equity
fund.: 94 More measurably, federal law treats the carried interest
that KKR earns as capital gain taxed at 20 percent rather than
ordinary income taxed at as much as twice that rate. 9 Moreover,
88 See, for example, id at 74'76 (describing the fallout from the private equity takeover of The Hertz Corporation, including multiple stock offerings that were handled by
intermediaries).
89 Id at 90 ( The hlierarchy of claims' on the rewards from investing in portfolio companies guarantees that the general partners of [private equity] funds will capture a disproportionate share of the value extracted from these companies.:).
90 Appelbaum and Batt, Private Equity at Work at 282 (cited in note 68) ( While
workers, vendors, creditors, and companies lost jobs, income, or solvency [in the private
equity firm's intervention in several businesses], the [private equity] owners walked away
virtually unscathed.:).
91 See Batt and Appelbaum, TheImpact of Financialization at *27 (cited in note 2).
92 See id at*24.
93 J osh Kosman, The Buyout of America: How Private Equity Is DestroyingJ obs and
Killing theAmerican Economy 29 (Penguin 2009).
94 SeeWilliamAlden, RethinkingtheTerm PrivateEquity'(NY Times,J an 31, 2013),
archived at http://perma.cc/ZE7P-FN4M. The industry appears to be reconsidering the
-private equity: label due to uncertain connotations. See id.
95 See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 NYU L Rev 1, 14 (2008) (describing how KKR qualifies for this lower tax
rate). See also Rande Spiegelman, Taxes: What's New for 2015? (Charles Schwab,J an 14,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ZE4Z-CCX9 (citing the maximum capital gains and income tax rates for 2015 at 20 and 39.6 percent, respectively).
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these intermediaries elude regulatory oversight, despite considerable efforts to increase transparency and control.96
Berkshire, in turn, pushes back on intermediaries, including
rivals like KKR. Buffett, who has written vigorous indictments of
the excessive fees of financial intermediaries97 has publicly and
formally objected to specific KKR fees. In 1996, when Buffett
served on the board of The Gillette Company' of which Berkshire
and its affiliates owned 11 percent' Gillette agreed to acquire
KKR's share of Duracell International for $7.82 billion in stock.98
KKR's bill was double that of Gillette's advisors99 (though in line
with market pricing), and Buffett strongly objected to the size of
the bill.loo Although outvoted by the rest of the board, Buffett went
on record as opposing intermediary pricing power.'() Berkshire's
record is unmistakable.
Despite many differences, Berkshire and KKR are both buyers of businesses and are therefore rivals. What they offer to
sellers of businesses, however, differs greatly. Berkshire stakes
all the capital necessary to offer a permanent, autonomous home
in a distinctive corporate culture free of short-term pressures.10 2
KKR stakes little funding' borrowing most and bringing in limited partners' and offers an operational and financial plan todeliver rapid and sizable fees to itself along with debt discharge and
returns to outside investors.103 Outcomes vary: not all Berkshire
companies prosper (although no companies are sold) and K KR has
both triumphs and failures (although all companies are sold).14
In the popular imagination and among many in the media, the
96 See generally Gretchen Morgenson, Private E quity's Free Pass (NY Times, July 26,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/H 26X-H BXF; Coffee, The Political Economy of DoddFrank, 97 Cornell L Rev 1019 (cited in note 3).
97 See Warren E. Buffett and Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for Corporate America 171 '74 (Carolina Academic 3d ed 2013). Munger has
bitingly criticized leverage buyouts and junk bonds. See id at 133'34, 208'11.
98 See Buffett Unable to Shave Fees in Duracell Deal (LA Times, Nov 27, 1996), archived at http://perma.cc/P2D4-ZKBZ; Kenneth N. Gilpin, Gillette to Buy Duracell for $7
Billion (NY Times, Sept 13, 1996), archived at http://perma.cc/LTW5-FJ 7N.
99 See Kilpatrick, Of Permanent Value at 436 (cited in note 50) ( Of the fees, $10
million went to [Gillette advisor] Morgan Stanley and Co. and $20 million to Kohlberg
K ravis Roberts and Co., the buyout firm which owned 34% of Duracell.:).
100 See Buffett UnabletoShave Fees in Duracell Deal (cited in note 98).
101 Id.
102 See Baker and Smith, The New Financial Capitalists at 168 (cited in note 17).
103 See id.
104 Ironically, Berkshire staked funds in one of the largest and worst K K R deals ever,
involving TXU Energy, an electric utility, for $44.37 billion in 2007. The deal soon collapsed, causing Berkshire an after-tax loss of nearly $1 billion. See Peter Lattman, A Record Buyout Turns Sour for Investors (NY Times, Feb 28, 2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/Z8J W-3QAQ.
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Berkshire model has been preferred over the KKR way' to the
consternation of the latter's devotees.los
Besides commanding their own fees and returns, KKR and
its industry stress returns to shareholders above all else in corporate life' including the welfare of employees, retirees, suppliers,
and customers.10 6 While the Berkshire model is also investor
first:' embracing an owner orientation' the long-term focus enables aligning shareholder returns with those of other constituents. Suppose labor costs are high: if the endgame is two years,
all cuts must be made in twoyears, necessitating layoffs and wage
freezes; but if the horizon is indefinite, cuts can be made gradually over a decade, which might be done with attrition and lower
raises. Nor is the Berkshire approach altruistic; rather, it is congruent with generating high and sustained returns on capital for
shareholders. The Berkshire model aspires to be win-win.
There are downsides to the Berkshire model.1o7 The selfreliance in acquisitions runs the risk of error given the absence of
significant cross-checks.1o8 The autonomy reposed in subsidiary
managers sometimes proves misplaced absent vetting or oversight.1o9 The decentralized structure can produce impositions on
customers or employees at the hands of other employees or distributors, or of other corporate constituents.11o Likewise, KKR acquisitions can yield win-win outcomes in which managers, investors, employees, and others all gain from a transition. But on
balance, Berkshire's anti-intermediation has proven spectacularly enrichingil and KKR's heavy intermediation is prone to ex112
cess for the reasons that J udge stresses.

105 See, for example, Baker and Smith, The New Financial Capitalists at 28"29 (cited
in note 17).
106 See GeorgeAnders, Merchants of Debt: KKR and theMortgaging ofAmerican Business 157'58 (Basic Books 1992) (quoting from private K K R memoranda in 1978 and 1987).
107 See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, Berkshire's Blemishes: TheVisible Costs
and Upshot of Buffett's Unique Managerial Model, 2016 Colum Bus L Rev (forthcoming)
(on file with author).
108 See id at *6'9.
109 See id at *9'12. See also Edward Greene and Olivia Schmid, Duty-Free Insider
Trading?, 2013 Colum Bus L Rev 369, 402 (describing an investigation against David
Sokol, a Berkshire senior executive, for insider trading, in which charges were eventually
dropped).
110 See Cunningham, Berkshire's Blemishes at *12'14 (cited in note 107). See also
Peter Dreier, H uman Rights Activists Protest NBA-Linked Sweatshops (H uffington Post,
May 25, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/42NU-SGJ X (describing protests against a
Berkshire subsidiary employing sweatshops in violation of human rights standards).
111 See Cunningham, Berkshire's Blemishes at *28 (cited in note 107).
112 See Anders, Merchants of Debt at 272'73 (cited in note 83) (discussing the failure
of KKR's high-leverage model). See alsoJ udge, 82 U Chi L Rev at 585'88 (cited in note4)
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The differences between Berkshire and KKR reflect a fundamental cultural contrast. In the K KR model, heavy debt and associated covenants and due dates not only boost immediate returns but also -impose[ ] a stringent discipline on management,
forcing executives not only to keep costs down, but also to divest
any business that might fetch a price higher than the value they
had placed on it.: 113 Besides not seeking immediate profit boosts,
Berkshire's culture requires nosuch external discipline: Thrift is
an inherent value. It induces cost minimization without the need
for covenants to impose discipline. And the idea of selling a business is antithetical to the sense of permanence intended to hold
Berkshire together in perpetuity. In contrast to the thick corporate culture that pervades Berkshire's subsidiaries, KKR companies have no common corporate culture.114
KKR is not a company in the same sense that Berkshire is,
nor is it a firm in the sense that Coase used that term. Berkshire
is a corporate entity owned by its shareholders and it comprises
hundreds of operating businesses and other investments to be
held indefinitely.115 Berkshire is a successful version of the conglomerate business model of the 1970s that firms like KKR participated in dismantling, seeingthem as bloated and unfocused.116
Unlike Berkshire, KKR is not a conglomerate organized for perpetual life and has no ability to reallocate capital across its portfolio companies' as Berkshire does across its subsidiaries.117 Rather, KKR consists of a series of distinct limited partnerships
organized as equity funds with finite lives of rarely more than a
decade.118 Unlike conglomerates, which seek to retain the businesses they acquire, KKR desires to divest them profitably and
relatively rapidly.119 Berkshire prospers from anti-intermediation
while KKR benefits from prointermediation.
(providing an example of how a prointermediation stance can lead toself-serving behaviors
by intermediaries).
113 Baker and Smith, The New Financial Capitalists at 98 (cited in note 17).
114 Id at 100 (_There was certainly no overarching headquarters bureaucracy, and no
common corporate culture [among KKR's holdings].:).
115 For a description of Berkshire's business activities, see Berkshire 2014 Report at
*45 (cited in note 21). For a list of Berkshire's subsidiaries, see id at *125'27.
116 See Baker and Smith, The New Financial Capitalists at 165'66 (cited in note 17)
(describing the conglomerate business model of the 1970s and 1980s).
117 See id at 171 (_Nor could KKR transfer cash from one company toanother, sothat
one corporation might support another's operations or investments. Since each investment
had separate equity holders, any attempt to intermingle activities in separate companies
was fraught with difficulties.:).
118 See id at 169'70 (charting KKR's business structure and holding periods for its
buyouts).
119 See Kaplan and StrOnberg, 23J Econ Persp at 128 (cited in note 16).
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J udge calls for more information to enable constituents to
compare the costs of alternative intermediary services.12o It would
be desirable for sellers of businesses' as well as other constituents' to have greater clarity about the fees associated with private equity transactions offered by KKR and its peers. But if intermediary influence or other forces persist in keeping the
industry opaque, competitive rivals such as Berkshire do exert
pressure. These rivals should stimulate questions by prospective
sellers and entice negotiated reductions by private equity firms.
More competition of this sort would therefore bea desirable counterweight to intermediary pricing power.
Few companies exhibit Berkshire's thoroughgoing disintermediation, but tailored versions of the model stress its virtues at
such well-known, conscious emulators as Markel Corporationl2l
and Leucadia National Corporation.22 More recent variations are
emerging in the technology sector, such as at Google in its reorganization as Alphabet Inc, designed on the Berkshire model.23
Promising derivations appear among shareholder-activist hedge
funds, such as Pershing Square Capital Management, which can
meet the goals of some private equity deals' particularly identifying and curing business problems' without incurring acquisition costs. 1 24 Allowed or encouraged to flourish, such competition

should put downward pressure on private equity fees. (They
might not provoke public disclosure, of course, which J udge
rightly notes may instead require regulation.)125
II. QUESTIONS

Whether considering either companies like Berkshire and
KKR in the acquisitions market or the examples that Professor
J udge offers of real estate agents, brokers, funds, and exchanges,
traditional theories help evaluate financial intermediation and
related institutional arrangements. But J udge's impressive accomplishment is to unite these disparate examples and approaches under the single heading of intermediary influence and
120
121

SeeJ udge, 82 U Chi L Rev at 636 (cited in note 4).
SeeJ ason Zweig, Like Buffett, Another Folksy Investor Turns Patience into Profit

(Wall St J, May 22, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/LH35-K E DB.
122 See Ari Charney, Betting on the Next Warren Buffett (Investing Daily, J une 12,
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/MDN5-S583.
123 See Tim Mullaney, TheTrue Mastermind behind Google's Alphabet? Warren Buffett(MarketWatch, Aug 17, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/B42S-CMLQ.
124 See Capitalism's Unlikely Heroes (Economist,
Feb 7, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/Q8H 4-X E L 3.
125 SeeJ udge, 82 U Chi L Rev at 636 (cited in note 4).
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to explain how it arises, how it is exercised, what some of the costs
are, and how participants might respond. As with most such serious intellectual endeavors, the claims are innovative, important,
and interesting' and they also raise questions, including those
discussed in the following sections.
A. Scope and Uniqueness of the Puzzle
First, J udge posits a prodigious puzzle to explain, but the
puzzle may be more modest than it seems. Intermediaries reduce
search costs and match end users with providers.126 Judge suggests that Internet technology should make searching and matching easier so that intermediary fees should fall.127 She sees the
opposite in many financial sectors, suggesting that the puzzle is
more pronounced there.128 Yet technology is not the only factor
that influences the costs of searching and matching that intermediaries can neutralize. Globalization and complexity may increase
search costs and complicate matching as well. In many contemporary industrial settings besides finance, supply chains have fragmented and intermediaries have proliferated. Moreover, Internet
technology may reduce some costs but raise others. For example,
websites that help buyers compare prices promise consumer savings but are funded by referral fees that often skew results sothat
users need other sites to compare the comparisons.129 More
broadly, problems with intermediary influence are not unique to
the financial services sector but plague all markets, including
those in which producers or manufacturers exert influence.130
B. How to Isolate Influence?
Second, Judge's examples of intermediaries suggest a degree
of influence, but it can be difficult to isolate intermediary influence on laws or norms from the influence of other participants.
For example, multiple intermediary sectors may each benefit
126

Id at 574 (noting that intermediaries -bridge information asymmetries, enable

parties tofind one another, and otherwise make it easier for parties to overcome the many
barriers to transacting:).
127

See id at 585.

See id at 585'86 (noting that it is surprising, in view of advances in technology
that bridge information asymmetries, that real estate agents are still compensated about
as much, in real dollars, as they were in the pre-Internet era).
129 See
Costly
Comparison
(Economist, J uly
11,
2015), archived
at
http://perma.cc/CEA4-4YLT.
130 See generally George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller, Phishing for Phools: The
Economics of Manipulation and Deception (Princeton 2015) (exploring and providing examples of firms distorting markets by appealing to human psychology).
128
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from a particular outcome, and it is challenging to discern which
exercises the relevant influence in shaping institutional arrangements. After fixed brokerage fees were replaced by competitive
rates in 1975 (to give an instance that J udge presents prominently), stockbrokers steered customers toward mutual funds instead of individual stocks because mutual funds were more lucrative' an apparent exercise of stockbroker intermediary
influence.131
But a number of concurrent influences might have contributed tothe same effect, including advertising by the mutual fund
industry 132 as well as urging by academic proponents of modern
portfolio theory's directive for individuals to diversify133 and by
management consultants who contended that mutual funds were
superior to conglomerates as a means of achieving such diversification.134 Above all, while J udge posits that the change in fee
structure was partly responsible for the shift from individual to
institutional stock ownership, that propensity is a characteristic
of a fully developed economy and stock market, independent of
5
brokerage-fee structures.1 3
Or consider auditing: Accountants may enjoy influence to assure that public companies must obtain audits of their financial
statements. But many other participants push for such certifications, too, including investors, academics, and regulators who legitimately appreciate the distinct consumer benefits of thirdparty testing.
As another example, certain intermediary sectors may not be
united on how to exercise their influence. The retail moneymanagement industry may be divided between actively managed

131
132

j udge, 82 U Chi L Rev at 579'80 (cited in note 4).
See Matthew P. Fink, The Riseof Mutual Funds: An Insider'sView 146'47 (Oxford

2008) (noting that in 1979 the SEC allowed mutual funds to run meaningful advertisements for the first time since 1933); Lee Gremillion, Mutual Fund Industry Handbook: A
Comprehensive Guide for Investment Professionals 32 (Wiley 2005) (describing several
ways that mutual funds transformed from a service to a product in the 1980s and 1990s,
including through advertising).
133 For a description of modern portfolio theory's stance on diversification, see Stewart
E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust Law Reform: How Prudent Is Modern Prudent Investor Doctrine?, 95 Cornell L Rev 851, 858'59 (2010).
134 SeeGerald F. Davis, KristinaA. Diekmann, and Catherine H.Tinsley, TheDecline
and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm in the 1980s: The Deinstitutionalization of an Organizational Form, 59Am Soc Rev 547, 563'64 (1994) (discussing changes in business rhetoric
about the effectiveness of the conglomerate form).
135 SeeJ udge, 82 U Chi L Rev at 606'07 (cited in note4).
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mutual funds and passively managed index funds.136 On some
matters, their interests converge and their collective influence is
directed to a joint end; on others, intermediary interests diverge,
with offsetting results.
C. Who Really Gains?
Third, Judge suggests that intermediary influence translates
into economic gain for intermediaries, but her illustrations are
instances of broader patterns in the economics of intermediaries
that often benefit and sometimes cost end users. Take two general
models of middlemen.137 In one, which is particularly attractive to
producers, middlemen bundle delivery of a company's product
with their own expert services. The middleman may be both a
salesman and a professional. Consider a dentist conducting a
checkupwhothen recommends an implant, or an optometrist giving an eye exam along with a prescription for glasses. Patients
ask physicians for advice based on trust, stressing the professional role more than the merchandising one. By training and ethics, the doctor's motivation is to provide the appropriate product;
by economic incentive, it is to sell the most expensive good that is
appropriate. In most cases, the patient's and physician's goals are
aligned, although premium pricing often results and physicians
exert influence on institutional arrangements to facilitate such
exchanges. Manufacturers of dental implants and eyewear benefit, too, enhancing their pricing power while outfitting patients
with desired necessities. This pattern parallels how mutual funds
have benefited greatly from stockbroker influence.
In a second form of intermediation, customers pay middlemen for the installation of manufactured products' such middlemen include automotive repair shops, electrical contractors, and
computer-hardware consultants. Invoices separate parts from labor and customers focus on labor, searching and negotiating for
low hourly rates more than examining or haggling over the choice
or price of goods. The intermediary's incentives are aligned with
customer interests to an extent, since reputations are on the line
to make repairs and installations that are safe and reliable. But
to the extent that price is a factor, incentives are to recommend
136 See generally] ohn C. Bogle, Common Sense on Mutual Funds: New Imperatives
for the Intelligent Investor (Wiley 2d ed 2009) (discussing the benefits and disadvantages
of investing in mutual funds versus index funds).
137 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Torkell E ide, and Patrick H argreaves, Quality Investing: Owning the Best Companies for the Long Term *56'58 (Harriman House forthcoming 2015) (on file with author).
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the most profitable inputs, which may impair customer interests
while helping manufacturers. In the financial services sector, auditors may recommend installing SAP risk management software
and rating agencies may endorse SAS stress testing software for
banks. When auditors and rating agencies wield influence in such
settings, they may generate higher fees for themselves but they
also confer pricing power on producers, and the exact distribution
of the gains eludes precise measurement.
D. Industry Structure and Causation
Finally, J udge implies that the influence of financial intermediaries often manifests itself in industry structure, particularly in oligopolisticfeatures.l38Yet it is not always clear whether
influence leads to oligopoly or oligopoly leads to influence.139 Oli-

gopolies in many sectors often result from products that deliver
distinct consumer benefits. Examples among financial intermediaries are auditors and debt-rating agencies, which provide testbased certifications of specialized information that investors cannot verify themselves. An oligopolistic structure can arise from
requirements of professionalization and scale rather than industry influence.140
As a broader category, consider producers of _modest essentials:' inputs that cost little in context but that are vital. Cheap
machine tools used in aerospace manufacturing, enzymes added
to food products such as yogurt, and industrial gases employed in
processes such as steelmaking all represent a tiny fraction of the
user's production costs, but each is essential.141 Providers therefore command pricing power, with the result that the industry is
dominated by large, reputable firms with oligopolistic industry
structures.1 42 Though not exactly middlemen, these providers
share something in common with financial intermediaries: when

138

See, for example,J udge, 82 U Chi L Rev at 621 '22 & n 211 (cited in note 4) (dis-

cussing the outsized influence exerted by financial intermediaries on the formation of the
Volcker Rule, which could have -direct implications for institutional arrangements that
[would] affect intermediary profitability and institutional design:).
139 See id at 618 ( Two factors' the number of participants in an industry and
whether industry participants are collectively organized for other purposes' affect the
probability that intermediaries will succeed in promoting favorable institutional
arrangements.:).
140 See Edgar K. Browning and Mark A. Zupan, Microeconomics: Theory and Applications 310'11, 359 (Wiley 7th ed 2002).
141 Cunningham, Eide, and Hargreaves, Quality Investing at *61 (cited in note 137).
142

Published by Chicago Unbound, 2017

See id.

21

University of Chicago Law Review Online, Vol. 82 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 13

The University of Chicago Law Review Dialogue

[82:177

raising capital, both auditing and rating fees are small in context
but are nevertheless an unavoidable prerequisite.
Oligopolistic intermediaries do tend to produce competition
among rivals that is more benign than vigorous. Firms that possess oligopoly power, especially those that provide relatively uniform products, know that they will be competing for decades to
come. 143The result is competitive behavior that promotes industry
stability more than it leads to price wars among rivals. This is
true not only of auditing and rating firms but also of suppliers of
industrial gases and makers of other modest essentials.144 Sothe
challenging question is whether intermediary influence causes institutional arrangements that create pricing power and high fees,
or whether institutional arrangements cause such intermediary
influence.
CONCLUSION

Professor J udge paints a rich picture, using an appealing
combination of broad strokes and pointillism toshed new light on
an old setting. She offers insightful accounts of specific features
of the financial services industry, such as why real estate agents
still command premium prices, why stockbrokers were able to
maintain anticompetitive fixed commissions for so long, and why
mutual funds proliferate while charging fees that exceed the
funds' value to investors. She steps back to explain general features of the financial landscape that give intermediaries potentially excessive pricing power, and catalogues the considerable
costs. And she notes potential policy responses, including stimulating private market actors to react.
In this Essay, I have extendedJ udge's insights with an illustration from the acquisitions market, depicting one firm (KKR)
that epitomizes intermediary influence, in contrast to a rival
(Berkshire)' the anti-intermediary par excellence. The juxtaposition affirms the portrait of intermediary influence that J udge
paints as well as the potential for correction through lower-priced
competition and fee disclosure that she posits.
J udge stresses that her accounts of intermediary influence
are partial explanations and that there are degrees of both their
143 See id at *63. See also Browning and Zupan, Microeconomics at 358 (cited in note
140) (describing the _strong mutual interdependence: of firms in an oligopolistic market,
meaning that -a firm's actions ... have a noticeable effect on its rivals, and so they are
likely to react in some way:) (emphasis omitted).
144 See Cunningham, Eide, and Hargreaves, Quality Investing at *60'63 (cited in
note 137).
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199

infl uence and their effects. This modesty explai ns the existence of
some of the unanswered questions I have highlighted. The importance ofJ udge's work is in showing why pursuing answers to
such questions is warranted' to gauge the puzzle's size; isolate
the specific influence; measure the relative gains; and examine
which comes first: intermediary influence that commands high
fees or institutional arrangements that condone them.
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Appendix to Innovation Sticks: The Limited
Case for Penalizing Failures to Innovate
Ian Ayrest & Amy Kapczynskitt
This Appendix first describes the data and methodology employed in our automobile-fatalities analysis. It then supplements
Parts II and III of our Article by providing additional examples
of innovation penalties in action in addition to background calculations for the fatality analysis.

I. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Our automobile-fatalities analysis is based on fatality rates
per 100,000 registered vehicles by vehicle manufacturer for the
years 2000 to 2011. After calculating base fatality rates, we adjust these rates to account for regional variation in fatality rates
and between-manufacturer variation in vehicle distribution
across the United States.
The crash-fatality data are from the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS), which includes a comprehensive report
of every fatal accident in the United States. Each vehicle involved in the accident is required to fill out an accident report.
We use four variables in our analysis: car make (manufacturer),
body type, number of total fatalities in the crash, and number of
fatalities in the vehicle.
We limit our analysis to passenger vehicles-that is, vehicles with a FARS body-type code under forty. This includes cars,
SUVs, vans, and light trucks. Vehicles with codes of forty or over
include semitrailer trucks, buses, motor homes, tractors, and
motorcycles.i Notably, we eliminate vehicles, not crashes. For

t
tt

William K. Townsend Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
This Appendix supplements Ian Ayres and Amy Kapczynski, Innovation Sticks: The
Limited Casefor PenalizingFailuresto Innovate, 82 U Chi L Rev 1781 (2015).
1 See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Electronic 2009 FARS Coding and Validation Manual 275-79 (National Center for Statistics and Analysis 2010).
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example, for an accident involving a motor home and a pickup
truck, we retain the pickup data but not the motor home data.
We limit our analysis to thirty-seven manufacturers, which
represent 99.4 percent of vehicles involved in fatal crashes from
the years 2000 to 2011. The manufacturers that we do not consider are either out of business (for example, American Motors
and Plymouth) or too rare to produce reliable fleet-size data (for
example, Maybach and Ferrari).
Each vehicle-level observation in the FARS data includes
two data points regarding fatalities: total fatalities in the crash
and fatalities inside the vehicle. From these two numbers, we
can further determine external fatalities-people killed while
inside other cars or while walking or bicycling-which is equal
to total fatalities minus fatalities inside the vehicle. This externalfatalities number can be further decomposed into (1) external fatalities outside vehicles-meaning pedestrians or bicyclistscalculated by subtracting the total number of fatalities inside all
vehicles from the total number of fatalities in crashes; and
(2) external fatalities inside vehicles, which is the total number
of external fatalities minus the external fatalities outside vehicles.
An example might help illustrate these numbers. Consider a
crash with five fatalities. The crash involves three cars: A (one
fatality), B (two fatalities), and C (zero fatalities). There are two
additional fatalities outside of cars. The total-fatality number
assigned to all three cars is five. The fatality-in-vehicle numbers
are one, two, and zero, respectively. The external-fatality number for A is four, for B is three, and for C is five. The externalfatality (not-in-vehicle) total number is two for all cars. And the
external-fatality (in-vehicle) total number is two less than the
external-fatalities number, or two, one, and three, respectively.
Because crashes often include more than one vehicle, our totalfatality numbers are often double counted, and external-fatality
numbers may also be counted more than once. We attribute the
entire accident to each vehicle involved, a practice that is consistent with the regulatory doctrine.
To develop a normalized scale on which to compare manufacturers, we utilize vehicle-registration data from a survey conducted by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). The
FHWA's Nationwide Household Travel Survey (NHTS) asked
Americans in 2001 and 2009 the makes of their cars, among other things. The number of observations in the surveys was 69,000
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in 20012 and 150,000 in 2009. 3 Because the sampling was not
purely random, the NHTS provides analytic weights that represent how many real households are represented by each household surveyed.
From these data, we determine fleet proportion by manufacturer. We linearly interpolate fleet proportion between survey
years and use the fleet proportion in 2001 for 2000 and the fleet
proportion in 2009 for 2010 and 2011. The year 2009 was the only one that included the manufacturers Smart and Land Rover,
so our numbers for those manufacturers reflect only the years
2009 to 2011.
By multiplying the fleet proportion by the number of registered vehicles in the United States-data aggregated from state
records by the US Department of Transportation (DOT)-we obtain the total number of registered vehicles in the country by
make.
Using the sum of each type of fatality (total, in vehicle, external, inside-car external, and outside-car external) by manufacturer and year as well as the total number of registrations by
manufacturer and year, we calculate the number of fatalities per
100,000 registered vehicles by manufacturer. These are our unadjusted fatality rates.
However, some manufacturers may sell more cars in comparatively more dangerous parts of the country than other manufacturers, thus introducing an upward bias to their fatality
rates. To control for regional variation in fatality rates and
manufacturer variation in vehicle location, we divide the country into four regions consistent with the US Census Bureau's delineation of geographic regions. 4 Using the fatality data and the
DOT's state-by-state registration data, we determine how much
above or below the weighted-mean fatality rate each region is
each year, when the weight is the region's proportion of national
registrations. Then, using the NHTS data, we determine the distribution of vehicles by manufacturer across the four regions.
The 2001 and 2009 vehicle distributions are averaged to compute each manufacturer's distribution for all years, which we

2
Federal Highway Administration, Introduction to the 2009 NHTS (DOT), archived at http://perma.cc/V8UF-PVN2.
3 Federal Highway Administration, 2009 National Household Travel Survey: User's Guide *1-2 (DOT, Oct 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/3398-4WJA.
4
See Census Regions and Divisions of the United States (Census Bureau), archived
at http://perma.cc/29E7-78SQ.
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assume does not change. Using these two pieces of information,
we can calculate an adjusted rate (fatalities per 100,000 registered vehicles) for each car using the formula:
(adjusted rate)iy = (unadjusted rate)iy- E (shareir * adjustmentiyr),
in which i indexes manufacturer, y year, and r region; share is
that car manufacturer's market share in that region; and adjustment is the difference between each region's fatality rate and
the national weighted mean. We subtract rather than add in order to adjust manufacturers' rates down if their cars are more
prevalent in high-fatality regions. We then use these adjusted
rates in our analysis.
Our data, then, comprise the thirty-seven manufacturers
over twelve years, and each manufacturer-year includes data on
the estimated total number of registrations in that year and
each of the fatality rates per 100,000 registered vehicles.
II. SUPPLEMENT: ADDITIONAL EXISTING EXAMPLES

A.

California's Zero Emission Vehicle Mandate

Another example in the fuel-efficiency area illustrates the
potential of sticks that are much more ambitious and also more
technology specific. In 1990, California introduced the Zero
Emission Vehicle (ZEV) mandate, requiring carmakers operating in California to develop automobiles with zero emissions. 5
The 1990 version of ZEV required 2 percent of California sales to
be zero emissions by 1998, 5 percent by 2001, and up to 10 percent by 2003; manufacturers faced a $5,000 penalty per vehicle
that was short of the requirement.6 In 1990, battery-powered
electric vehicles were the only option for meeting this requirement. Only General Motors was working on an electric car in the
1980s-the Impact-which was not ready for commercialization Thus, the ZEV mandate was in reality a mandate to do the
R & D needed to produce viable electric cars. Carmakers viewed

5
See Philippe Larrue, Lessons Learned from the Californian ZEVMandate: From
a "Technology-Forcing"to a 'Market-Driven"Regulation *15 (Groupement do Recherches

Economiques et Sociales, June 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/6LAY-RWDZ.
6
Id at *6. Several other states also adopted the standards, increasing their effect.
See id.
7
See EVI Electric Automobile (National Museum of American History), archived
at http://perma.cc/33GR-54EC.
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the mandate as extraordinarily demanding, and they insisted
8
that it could not be met.
California's ZEV program does, however, seem to have
spurred research and innovation. The best evidence of this
comes from patent patterns, 9 emphasizing the point that we
make in our Article: carrots and sticks can be-and in many
cases are and should be-combined. The number of patents for
electric-vehicle-related technology increased dramatically in the
period from 1992 to 1998.10 General Motors purportedly spent $1
billion on ZEV technology during this time period. 11 Also in the
early 1990s, a number of high-tech California firms sprung up to
develop products for the ZEV market.12 And within existing battery companies, researchers turned some of their attention to
the electric-car market.13
The ZEV program appears to be a good candidate for sticks
for the same reasons described in our discussion of the CAFE
program. 14 In addition, the ZEV program helps illustrate some of
the limits of innovation sticks that we describe more theoretically
in Part I of the main text. 15 The ZEV program arguably represents the government's attempt to pick winners, and it has not
been fully successful in projecting the possible pace of technological change. In 1996, California decided to suspend the 1998 and
2001 deadlines because battery technology was not progressing
quickly enough. 16 The ZEV mandate was further modified to allow
hybrid and other vehicles to count for partial ZEV credits. 17 In the
terms we use in our Article, sticks may face credibility problems,
perhaps particularly when they are applied to powerful industries. Nonetheless, these problems may not be insurmountable.
8
See Larrue, Lessons Learned from the CalifornianZEVMandate at *7 (cited in
note 5).
9 See Andrew Burke, Ken Kurani, and E.J. Kenney, Study of the Secondary Benefits of the ZEVMandate *11-12 (University of California, Davis Institute of Transportation Studies, Aug 1, 2000), archived at http://perma.cc/D6K6-WJMA.
10 See id at *17.
11 See Committee on State Practices in Setting Mobile Source Emission Standards,
State andFederal Standardsfor Mobile-Source Emissions 169 (National Academies 2006).
12 See Larrue, Lessons Learned from the CalifornianZEVMandate at *9 (cited in
note 5).
13 See id at *10.
14 See Part II.A. 1 in the main text.
15 See Part I.C in the main text.
16 See Larrue, Lessons Learned from the Californian ZEVMandate at *11-12 (cited
in note 5).
17 See id at *15; Gary E. Marchant, Sustainable Energy Technologies: Ten Lessons
from the History of Technology Regulation, 18 Widener L J 831, 838 (2009).

http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev_online/vol82/iss1/13

28

Cunninghame: Intermediary Influence and Competition: Berkshire versus KKR

2015]

Innovation Sticks: Appendix

Notably, the ZEV program continues-California has recently
announced a 15.4 percent ZEV goal by 202518-and it appears to
have had positive effects, although it has not had all the effects
that were desired. The field of electric cars has dramatically expanded in recent years, with Chevrolet, Ford, Honda, Hyundai,
Nissan, Tesla, and Toyota all offering or about to offer electric
cars. 19 Battery-powered electric cars are also no longer the only
option: many car companies have announced plans for hydrogenfuel cell cars to be released by 2016.20
B.

Tobacco Look-Back Penalties

In an effort to resolve litigation against the tobacco industry
while generating revenue for the states and reducing the prevalence of youth tobacco use, tobacco companies and states reached
a proposed settlement agreement in 1997 that included an element that would have produced failure-to-innovate incentives.21
While the agreement's implementing legislation was ultimately
unsuccessful, its "look-back" provisions-which were excluded
from subsequent settlements22-represented potential innovation sticks aimed at reducing youth-smoking rates.
Specifically, the proposed agreement established statespecific standards for reductions in youth smoking. For example,
the agreement required that, within ten years after its implementation, states would have had to have effected at least a 60
percent reduction in youth-cigarette-use rates and a 45 percent
reduction in smokeless tobacco use among youths.23 If these
standards were not met, industries would have been subject to a
mandatory fine calculated from the estimated profits gained
from youth consumers in excess of the standards, with an inflationadjusted maximum fine of about $2 billion for each industry.24
The potential fine could have been reduced by a maximum of 75
percent for tobacco companies on a showing of full implementation
of measures to reduce tobacco use among youths, reasonable
18 John O'Dell, Will California'sZero-Emissions MandateAlter the Car Landscape?
(Edmunds.com, May 27, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/U2EP-6HRA.
19 Id.

20

Id.

See Proposed Tobacco Industry Settlement (CNN, June 20, 1997), archived at
http://perma.cc/59BC-FK76 ("Proposed Tobacco Settlement").
22 Michael Givel and Stanton A. Glantz, The "Global Settlement" with the Tobacco
Industry: 6 Years Later, 94 Am J Pub Health 218, 219-20 (2004).
23 Proposed Tobacco Settlement (cited in note 21).
21

24
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efforts to curtail youth tobacco use, and the absence of actions to
thwart meeting the reduction standards.25 In theory, these lookback penalties represented a robust incentive for tobacco manufacturers to reduce youth tobacco use. However, unlike our preferred implementation, which would be technology agnostic, the
proposed incentives were substantially tied to states enacting a
prespecified set of provisions.26
A nontraditional measure makes sense here to address the
market failure associated with the incentives that companies
have to increase youth smoking despite its social consequences.
A stick approach is plausibly more appropriate than a carrot approach because this is a good example of an area in which we
have few concerns about undercompensation and because there
are many inexpensive ways for companies to reduce youth smoking (for example, by shifting ad campaigns or developing savvy
antismoking campaigns targeted at youths). Additionally, if requiring companies to internalize more of the costs of youth
smoking were to force some of them out of the industry or to
raise the price of cigarettes, this would likely be a net gain from
a welfarist or public health perspective. Again, this example
raises concerns about the credibility of sticks, and it also gives
us an example of a distributional concern in play: net transfers
to tobacco companies in order to reduce youth smoking would
likely be seen as perverse, insofar as the companies are
thought-particularly in the course of the litigation in question-to bear responsibility for the problem in the first place.
The issue is not merely moral; if we reward firms for reversing
negative effects for which they are considered responsible, we
might reasonably expect more bad effects to follow.
C.

Negligent Failure to Test and the State-of-the-Art Defense
in Tort Law

Companies that manufacture faulty products face liability
in tort if they fail to comport with legal requirements.27 Tort law
thus acts as a stick, and in certain dimensions it may serve as
an innovation stick. Particularly relevant here are the doctrine
25

See id.

See Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer, The Tobacco Deal, 1998 Brookings Papers on Econ Activity: Microecon, 323, 382 (1998) (arguing that "the incentives for reducing underage smoking should be directed at state governments, which would be responsible for the efficacy of antismoking programs").
27
See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 1 (1998).
26
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regarding a company's duty to test its products and the so-called
state-of-the-art defense to tort liability. These obligations arise
under state law and are not uniform across jurisdictions. For our
purposes, it is sufficient to look to the Restatement (Third) of
Torts ("the Restatement") and at certain leading cases that reflect the general view of these doctrines.
Under the Restatement, there are three types of product defects: (1) design defects, which occur when the foreseeable risks
of the product could be reduced by the manufacturer's "adoption
of a reasonable alternative design"; (2) manufacturing defects, or
departures from the planned design; and (3) warning defects,
which occur when the manufacturer could have reduced the risk
of a product with instructions or warnings when the risk was
reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer.28 Courts have typically applied the duty to test indirectly, as a way to get at the
existence or absence of such design, manufacturing, or warning
defects.29 The manufacturer's knowledge may be relevant to the
feasibility of alternative designs or to the reasonableness of
warnings, and the duty to test is a way of imputing to the manufacturer knowledge of these possible designs or warnings.30
The intuition behind the duty to test is clear: a manufacturer should not be able to shield itself from liability for defective products by failing to undertake research that would have
28 Id at § 2, comment m.
29 See, for example, Burton u R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co, 397 F3d 906, 920 (10th Cir
2005) ("In Kansas, the core purpose of a duty to test is to avoid production of defective
products."); Kociemba u G.D. Searle & Co, 707 F Supp 1517, 1527-28 (D Minn 1989)
(stating that "[t]his Court has already held that the duty to test is a subpart of the duty
to warn" and that "[t]he duty to test is a subpart of the other three duties because a
breach of the duty to test cannot by itself cause any injury"). See also Russell J. Davis,
Carolyn Bower, and Robert D. Hursh, 1 American Law of Products Liability § 11:4
(Thomson/West 3d ed 2005):
[A] manufacturer's duty to test the product is subsumed under its duties to exercise reasonable care in the design and manufacture of the product and to
provide adequate warnings of dangers associated with the product's use; thus,
breach of a duty to test is not a separate basis for cause of action based on a
claim of negligence.
A minority of courts have found an independent duty to test. See, for example, Borel V
FibreboardPaper Products Corp, 493 F2d 1076, 1091 (5th Cir 1973) (finding that, under
Texas law, "the manufacturer's duty to test his product is well-established'); J.B. Horne
u Liberty FurnitureCo, 452 S2d 204, 209 (La App 1984) ("[T]he manufacturer has an independent duty to test and inspect its product.").
30 See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability § 2, comment m (cited in note
27) ("A seller is charged with knowledge of what reasonable testing would reveal. If testing is not undertaken, or is performed in an inadequate manner, and this failure results
in a defect that causes harm, the seller is subject to liability for harm caused by such defect.").
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revealed such defects. Customers have little ability to conduct
testing on their own, making manufacturers, in tort parlance,
the cheapest-cost avoiders, particularly when the negative effects of these products are complex and difficult to discern.31
In its application, however, the duty to test presents difficulties. In particular, how are courts to know how much testing
is adequate? Critics have argued that the case law provides few
clear guidelines regarding the extent of the duty to test. 32 Courts
tend to speak generally about the foreseeability of the possible
harm and the practicability of testing,33 and their conclusions often turn on very specific facts such as the existence of warning
signs that should lead a reasonable manufacturer to further investigate.34 Notably, courts often speak of the importance of the
manufacturer's status as an expert in a particular field.35 This

31 See, for example, Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of
Toxic Products, 82 Cornell L Rev 773, 798 n 86 (1997); Dalehite v United States, 346 US
15, 52 (1953) (Jackson dissenting) ("Where experiment or research is necessary to determine the presence or the degree of danger, the product must not be tried out on the
public, nor must the public be expected to possess the facilities or the technical
knowledge to learn for itself of inherent but latent dangers.").
32
See, for example, Lars Noah, Platitudes about "ProductStewardship" in Torts:
Continuing Drug Research and Education, 15 Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev 359, 365
(2009) (stating that "case law offers essentially no guidance about the contours of such a
duty to test"); Daniel R. Cahoy, Medical Product Information Incentives and the Transparency Paradox, 82 Ind L J 623, 641 (2007) (noting that "courts rarely engage in hindsight analysis to imagine what studies might have uncovered defects that were not reasonably foreseeable at the time").
33 See E.L. Kellett, Manufacturer'sDuty to Test or Inspect as Affecting His Liability
for Product-CausedInjury, 6 ALR3d 91 (1966) ("Many cases have recognized or applied
the general rule that a manufacturer has a duty to test and inspect his products, at least
where the nature of the product is such that damage from its use is foreseeable, and
where tests or inspections are practicable and would be effective.").
34 See, for example, Huggins v Stryker Corp, 932 F Supp 2d 972, 987 n 14 (D Minn
2013) ("[A] manufacturer's duty to additionally test and investigate the propensities of
its product is dependent upon the foreseeable risk of harm to potential users in light of
current scientific or medical knowledge and discoveries."); Pratherv Abbott Laboratories,
960 F Supp 2d 700, 713-14 (WD Ky 2013) (stating that the defendant "had an obligation
to conduct some amount of testing, defined by what risks the medical community identified or suspected the product to have," but refusing to find the defendant in breach of
that duty when contemporaneous medical knowledge did not put the defendant on notice
of the risk); Richter v Limax International,Inc, 45 F3d 1464, 1471 (10th Cir 1995) (stating that "[m]anufacturers do not have a duty to test for inconceivable dangers, nor do
they have a duty to test for every conceivable danger," but finding, in light of widespread
biomechanical knowledge, that a trampoline manufacturer had breached its duty to test
for the risk of stress fractures to ankles).
35 See, for example, Feldman v Lederle Laboratories,479 A2d 374, 387 (NJ 1984) ("[A]
reasonably prudent manufacturer will be deemed to know of reliable information generally
available or reasonably obtainable in the industry or in the particular field involved. Such
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invokes the potential of yardsticks to reduce information costs,
as we describe in our Article.36 If a court can determine, for example, that most car companies do rollover tests to ensure the
safety of their seat belts, then this could serve as evidence that a
company that failed to do such tests breached its duty to undertake reasonable tests. 37 Tort law commonly uses custom in an
industry to define appropriate standards of care. 38 We imagine
an analogous approach, in which custom is determined not with
respect to the design of products but rather with respect to the
design of R & D programs. While this might be difficult in nonhomogeneous industries, for industries in which firms are in relevant ways similar or in which differences can be accounted for,
recourse to custom could help identify a minimum level of R & D
that should be required.39 The results will surely be imperfect.40
The critical question, however, is how the results would compare
to the alternative, in which firms have perverse incentives not to
conduct R & D that might discover dangers even though they
are in the best position to discover those dangers.
The state-of-the-art defense raises issues similar to those of
the duty to test, but in a different posture. Here, companies can
escape liability if they show that their products were state of the
art such that there was no feasible better design or better warning
information need not be limited to that furnished by experts in the field, but may also
include material provided by others.").
36
See Part L.A in the main text.
37 See Hopper u Crown, 646 S2d 933, 945-46 (La App 1994) (holding that a forklift
manufacturer "breached its duty to test and experiment commensurate with the danger"
when it failed to test the safety of a doorless forklift, knowing that its competitors offered
forklifts with doors for safety purposes). This example illustrates that in certain applications, such as those described in our analysis of automobile fatalities, tort law can be a
barrier to entry. We acknowledge that such barriers may result in economic inefficiencies. However, we emphasize that tort law, as an innovation stick, is an effective tool of
innovation policy that can lead to broader efficiency gains for society.
38
See Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden, and Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts § 179
(West 2d ed 2000) ("[C]ustom may be admissible as tending to show that a party's conduct did or did not meet the reasonable person standard of care."); Kenneth S. Abraham,
Custom, Noncustomary Practice, and Negligence, 109 Colum L Rev 1784, 1786 (2009)
("Evidence of an actor's compliance with custom is admissible ... to show reasonable care,
and evidence of an actor's departure from custom is admissible ... to show negligence.").
39 See notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
40 This is true not only because custom may be difficult to discern but also because
courts will make mistakes in discerning it.In addition, entire industries may underinvest in R & D, creating circularity problems. In theory, yardsticks can move the entire
field to better performance because firms that can excel have an incentive to move ahead
of their peers. But a dynamically efficient feedback loop of this sort would be very difficult to achieve with the blunt weapon of tort law due to the many factors that mediate
the relationship between tort liability and long-term corporate decisionmaking.
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given the state of knowledge at the time.41 The point of the de-

fense is to provide a safe harbor to ensure that manufacturers
are not penalized for undertaking tests-an activity that could
otherwise be perversely deterred by tort law.42 But the doctrine
serves this purpose well only if it correctly identifies the level of
testing that is appropriate to trigger the safe harbor. Consequently, as some courts have recognized, the state of the art
should be defined 'in terms of what the industry as a whole
knew or could have discovered by properly fulfilling their duty to
3
test these products."4
This raises the key question for this innovation stick: What
level of testing should be required before the safe harbor applies? Jurisdictions have taken two main approaches to defining
the technological standard required to show that a product is
state of the art. Some ask whether there was no feasible safer
product, while others ask whether the defendant's product conformed to industry standards.44 The former appears to impose
very high information burdens on the court, but the latter seems
likely to provide inadequate incentives to test.45 A better approach might have yardstick qualities, and it might ask courts
not to determine that there was no product possibly safer than

41 See, for example, James Boyd and Daniel E. Ingberman, Should "Relative Safety"
Be a Test of Product Liability?, 26 J Legal Stud 433, 435 (1997). See also Jane Stapleton,
Liability for Drugs in the U.S. and EU: Rhetoric and Reality, 26 Rev Litig 991, 1011
(2007) ("[W]here the alleged 'defect' consists of a failure to warn of a risk, and where such
a warning was impossible given the state of the art of the epidemiological data relating
to the drug at the time it was supplied, that claim of 'defect' will fail."). In most jurisdictions, state-of-the-art evidence is "only a factor in determining liability," but in a minority of states (at least twelve), it is a conclusive defense and usually operates by establishing a rebuttable presumption that the relevant product was not defective. Boyd and
Ingberman, 26 J Legal Stud at 441 (cited in note 41).
42 See Wagner, 82 Cornell L Rev at 794-96 (cited in note 31). This example helps
illustrate the point about baselines made above. See notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
As a safe harbor, we might also conceive of this as an innovation carrot: a firm enjoys the
benefit of a defense from liability if it conducts the right level of R & D.
43 Dartez v FibreboardCorp, 765 F2d 456, 463 (5th Cir 1985) (emphasis added). See
also Artis v Corona Corp of Japan, 703 A2d 1214, 1217 n 6, 1218 (DC App 1997) (citing
the Dartez formulation favorably and reversing a grant of summary judgment for the
defendant because the lower court failed to consider what a "competent manufacturer
reasonably could have developed at the time the [product] was manufactured and sold,"
despite the lack of commercially available safety measures at the time of the injury).
44 See Boyd and Ingberman, 26 J Legal Stud at 436-40 (cited in note 41) (surveying
cases and jurisdictions that apply these two standards).
45 For further discussion of the inadequate incentives to test, see id at 439-40.
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the defendant's but rather to use industry standards to require
above-average safety and above-average investments in R & D.46
We do not wish to overstate the power of tort law to directly
promote investments in research on product safety. Courts have
found the extent of the duty to test difficult to define (though as
just suggested, some of the informational problems that courts
face might be minimized with yardstick approaches). Other aspects of tort liability also undermine its potential to serve as an
effective tool of innovation policy. In particular, plaintiffs bear
the burden of proving causation-but depending on how that requirement is construed and the level of evidence required to get
to a jury, plaintiffs may be unable to make this showing in the
absence of epidemiological (or similarly systematic) research
that connects the product in question to the harms that the
plaintiffs have suffered. 47 There is thus a circularity problem:
plaintiffs may be unable to prevail on a theory of failure to test
unless they already know what testing would have shown.48 This
can be seen as an innovation stick that is imposed on the wrong
party: plaintiffs are denied relief for their injuries unless they
perform expensive studies that identify the causes of those injuries, even though manufacturers are in a superior position to
perform studies.
Our analysis offers reasons that courts might be appropriately cautious regarding the deployment of this particular innovation stick, and it also offers a clear account of its importance.
Caution seems appropriate because courts may not know what
level of R & D is appropriate. But as we have described, yardstick
46 See id at 435-36 (noting that if a test incorporates government standards, it may
reduce the underprovisions and overprovisions of safety that occur under other tests).
47 See Wagner, 82 Cornell L Rev at 774-75 (cited in note 31).
48 For an expansive understanding of how causation might be understood in this
context, see Zuchowicz u United States, 140 F3d 381, 386-87 (2d Cir 1998) (affirming a
lower court's decision allowing expert witnesses to testify regarding causation in a drug
case, despite the fact that no epidemiological or associated clinical trial evidence was
available). Epidemiological evidence is not always required. For example, courts may allow a jury to infer causation from circumstantial evidence of exposure, along with symptoms that have no other known explanation. See Dobbs, Hayden, and Bublick, The Law
of Torts at § 191 (cited in note 38). Plaintiffs with unusual symptoms may thus be able to
get to a jury without scientific proof of causation, while those who have symptoms that
could be caused by many things-by cancer, for example-may have a much more difficult time showing causation without epidemiological proof. See Daniel A. Farber, Toxic
Causation, 71 Minn L Rev 1219, 1251-53 (1987). Sometimes causation will also be unproblematic. If the plaintiff is injured in a car crash because a seat belt disengaged during a rollover, the cause of the injury will not be difficult to discern-although the appropriate level of R & D might be.
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approaches-based on a kind of customary level of R & D-can
help mitigate the problem. At a minimum, courts should be
aware of the importance of the failure-to-test doctrine as well as
of the radical underinvestment in testing that is likely to follow
if companies are not obliged to test their products in reasonable
ways. Courts might also begin to develop the significance of the
doctrine if they invite evidence regarding industry R & D standards relevant to a particular context. Another way to make
more-extensive use of tort law as an innovation stick would be to
shift the burden to companies to disprove causation if they fail
to undertake a defined level of minimal testing with the appropriate level of testing defined by industry. 49 Statutes could be
used to define the appropriate level of testing, reducing the information burden on courts and increasing predictability for industry.50 This would replicate something akin to the FDA standards forbidding the sale of drug products without certain levels
of testing submitted in advance, although using not a property
rule (the FDA's ban on marketing) but rather a liability rule (in
the form of compensatory tort liability).51 The information
asymmetries between consumers and producers in such cases
would appear to make such an approach very valuable, perhaps
when combined with a set of traditional or nontraditional carrots.

III.

SUPPLEMENT: ADDITIONAL AUTOMOBILE-FATALITIES
ANALYSIS

Given that automobile fatalities involving laggard manufacturers are not well internalized-as presented in our discussion
supporting Table 2 in the main text-we ask: How concretely

49 Professor Wendy Wagner has proposed a system like this for toxic torts. As she
envisions it, the plaintiff would establish a prima facie case by showing:

(1) inadequate minimal testing on a product, (2) normal or foreseeable exposure to the product, and (3) serious harm that might be causally linked to exposure to the product. The plaintiff could satisfy the harm element, depending
on jurisdiction, by demonstrating the existence of latent physical harms (e.g.,
cancer, reproductive ailments), emotional harms, medical monitoring costs, or
an increased risk of latent physical harm.
Wagner, 82 Cornell L Rev at 834-35 (cited in note 31) (citations omitted).
50
See id at 807-09.
51 Because tort law is keyed to harm, such a model would not generate impetus to
show evidence of effectiveness as FDA requirements do. Line-drawing issues-for example, about when such testing should be required (for some products but not others) and
how courts would determine industry standards-would of course follow.
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might a CAFE-like system be applied to internalize these costs
of above-median fatality risks?
One way to internalize the costs of above-median fatalities
would be to introduce financial penalties that are a function of
how much a manufacturer's historic fatality rate has exceeded
the median manufacturer rate on a year-by-year basis.52 As with
Table 2 in the main text, the per-vehicle penalties reported below in Table 1A are best construed as upper-bound estimates;
enlightened regulations might phase in the penalties so that
manufacturers with poor safety standards would have time to
correct their ways. 53 By estimating the per-vehicle costs associated with excess fatalities, Table 1A dramatizes the extent of
the problem.

52 To translate the flow of annual manufacturer penalties into a one-time charge,
we calculate the present value of a ten-year annuity-assuming that the average car
stays on the road for ten years-at a 5 percent discount rate.
53 Our current approach also penalizes manufacturers for their stocks of cars that
are on the road. While it is ultimately appropriate to have manufacturers internalize the
costs of excess danger produced by their stocks of historic sales, another phase of penalties might limit manufacturer liability to those cars that were sold after the regulation
went into effect.
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TABLE 1A. ESTIMATES OF ABOVE -MANUFACTURER-MEDIAN
4
FATALITY RATES AND ASSOCIATED PER-VEHICLE COSTS5
Per-Vehicle Time-ofPurchase Cost for
Per-Vehicle Time-of-

Fatalities above Median,

Average Fatality Rate over

Purchase Cost for

Controlling for Miles

Median

Fatalities above Median

Driven

(Fatality Rate/100,000
Vehicles), Based on

($[Vehicle), Based on

($/Vehicle), Based on

Twelve-Year Average

Twelve-Year Average

Twelve-Year Average

Total

External

Total

External

Total

External

Fatalities

Fatalities

Fatalities

Fatalities

Fatalities

Fatalities

$4,596

$1,535

$3,895

$941

$,74

$262

$230 I

$2,468

$2,179

$610

$3,115

$1,769

$2,061

$1,350

$1,568

$235
$718

1
$1,499

Mitsubishi

7.83

Kia

3.71

GMC

30O2

Chevrolet

Ford

3 51

2.67
125

009

$1

$111

107

172

$1,008

$681I

Dodge

$1,511

$1,572

$0

$827

$37

$13
$0

$804
Jnfmniti
Nissan
Datsun1

-Jagua

$514
007

001

$40

$6

004

0

$24

$0

$75

$28

$698

0 03

$17-1

54 The first two columns are the twelve-year-average fatality rates over median for
each manufacturer. Only manufacturers who have had a total-fatality rate over median
in at least one of the years 2000 to 2011 are shown here. The second two columns show
the average social costs per year, annuitized at 5 percent for ten years. This represents
the average external fatalities at the time of purchase of the average vehicle made by
that manufacturer and at the time of purchase for total or external fatalities. Average
yearly social cost per vehicle, which we annuitize above, is calculated by dividing each
manufacturer's fatality rate over the median rate by 100,000 vehicles and multiplying
that number of fatalities by $7.4 million, the value of a human life as calculated by the
EPA, and then averaging over 12 years. Nineteen car manufacturers produced below
median for both total- and external-fatality rates for all twelve years.
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Oldsmobile

0.01

0

$4

$0

$846

$0

Porsche

0

0

$0

$0

$968

$98

0

0

$0

$0

$34

$16

MercedesBenz

The "state-based costs of death from crashes" have been an
independent concern of the Centers on Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which in 2005 estimated the state-specific costs
of crash deaths.55 But somewhat bizarrely, the CDC's comparison of states does not control for differences in population size.
Thus, the CDC website warns that "half of all costs [from crash
deaths] were found in 10 states."56 The CDC notes that "It]he ten
states with the highest medical and work loss costs were California
($4.16 billion), Texas ($3.50 billion), Florida ($3.16 billion),
Georgia ($1.55 billion), Pennsylvania ($1.52 billion), North
Carolina ($1.50 billion), New York ($1.33 billion), Illinois ($1.32
billion), Ohio ($1.23 billion), and Tennessee ($1.15 billion)."57
It should hardly be surprising, however, that California and
New York, because of their sheer population sizes, are ranked
among the top ten most costly states in terms of fatal-crash costs
even though these states rank below median in terms of both total and external fatalities. If we instead simply divide the CDC
cost estimates by the number of registered automobiles in each
state, we see a ranking that closely parallels the ranking in Figure 4 in our Article, with Mississippi, Arkansas, and South
Carolina as the most fatal states.
In Table 2A, we present estimates for above-state-median
fatality rates, calculated analogously to the estimates in Table 2
in the main text. 58 Table 2A also reports the per-vehicle social
costs at the time of purchase for fatalities over median based on
55 See State-Based Costs of Deaths from Crashes (CDC, Sept 10, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/2D6U-PJZ6. See also generally Rebecca B. Naumann, et al, Incidence
and Total Lifetime Costs of Motor Vehicle-Related Fatal and Nonfatal Injury by Road
User Type, United States, 2005, 11 Traffic Injury Prevention 353 (2010).
56 State-Based Costs of Deaths from Crashes (cited in note 55).
57 Id.
58 Above-median fatality rates-both total and external-are calculated by subtracting the fatality rate for each state in each year from the median fatality rate for
that year. These differences are then averaged over the twelve years in the sample.
Twelve states have total- and external-fatality rates that never exceed the median rate
and do not appear in the table, as their total- and external-fatality rates over median are
zero.
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the CDC's cost-calculating methodology, which focuses on the
social cost from health care and lost work instead of our cost-oflife approach.59 Even using the CDC's more conservative valuation method, we find that Mississippi's per-vehicle (point-of-sale)
cost would be more than $2,300 and that its annual penalty
would be more than $600 million.
TABLE 2A. ABOVE-STATE-MEDIAN FATALITY RATES AND
ASSOCIATED PER-VEHICLE COSTS
Social Cost at Time of

CDC Cost over

Average Fatality Rate over

Purchase for Fatalities over

Median per

Median

Median

Vehicle

Vehicles), Based on Twelve-

($/Vehicle), Based on

($/Vehicle),

Year Average

Twelve-Year Average

2005

(Fatality Rate/100,000

State

Total

External

Total

External

Fatalities

Fatalities

Fatalities

Fatalities

CDC Cost

$15,710

$5,594

$2,337

15.21

$8,926

$3,083

$1,229

13.00

$7,630

$2,606

$839

11.06

$6,489

$2,598

$1,023

10.72

$6,288

$2,729

$526
$852

9.55

$5,603

$852

$454

9.08

$6,003
$5,326

$2,010

$671

8.26

$4,849

$1,929

$686

7.12

$4,181

$2, 134

$436

5.12

$3,003

$1,549

$370

26.77
17.641

59
For a fuller description of the CDC's methodology, which was estimated solely for
2005 data, see Naumann, et al, 11 Traffic Injury Prevention at 354-55 (cited in note 55).
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$2,711

$408

$307

$2,554

$1,420

$295

$1,511

$1,094

$6

$837

$635

$266

$268

$417
$485

$116

$435

$368

$76

$0
$0

$292

$245

$241

$33

$79

$44

$38

$0
$0

$12
$26

Social Cost at Time of
CDC Cost

Purchase for Fatalities over

Average Yearly Social Cost

over Median

Median, Corrected for Miles

of Fatalities over Median

per Vehicle

Driven

($ Million), Based on

($ Million),

($/Vehicle), Based on

Twelve-Year Average

2005

Twelve-Year Average

Total

External

Total

External

Fatalities

Fatalities

CDC Cost

Fatalities

Fatalities

MS

$4,070

$1,450

$605

$13,127

$4,498

SC

$3,870
$2,630

$1,330

$9126;
$7,611

$2,558

NMI
WV

$1,400

$477

$154

$7,805

$2,763

AZ

$3,390

$1,350

$534

$6,336

State

$533

$1,12
$2,605

NV
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KY

$2,800

$1,220

$379

$5,449

$2,424

MT

$722

$109

$59

$4,704

$676

TN

$3,450

$1,310

$435

$4,176

$1,561

MO

$2,900

$1,150

$410

$4,255

$1,726

TX

$8,700

$4,450

$908

$2,970

$1,653

GA

$3,050

$1,570

$375

$1,427

$902

$69
$0

$52
$1

$3,123
$721$35

$640

$782
$36

$434
$11

$90
$6

$2,090
$39

$1,288
$14

DE

$140

$103

$1

$1,353

$1,090

IN VTI

$24
$562

$1
$438

$$180
$179

$391

$9
$439

(MS
PA

$11
$619

$20
$148

$5$85$4
$97

$781

$293

NE

$94

$81

$0

$514

$468

MD
I

$149
$0

$126
$119

$0
$0

$27
$0

$108
$8;!

CO

$124

$18

$0

$189

$12

AK

$6

$3

$0

$600

$168

IA

$0

$11

$0

$0

$23

ID

$458
ND $11

KS
WII
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Accounting for Differences in Teenage and Under-theInfluence Driving

Of course, as with our manufacturer proposal, a necessary
condition before imposing such a state-incentive regime would
be considering the possibility that state actions could reduce the
risk of fatalities. It would be inappropriate to deploy innovation
sticks to incentivize manufacturer or state responses to abovemedian fatality rates if there were no credible actions that the
manufacturer or state could take to reduce those rates. In this
Section, we estimate the extent to which our above-median estimates are driven by differences in teenage-driving and underthe-influence-driving fatality rates, and we assess the extent to
which a manufacturer or state might respond to such fatalityrate influences.
The fatality rates experienced by manufacturers and states
might also be impacted by differences in the recklessness of
their drivers. Teenage-male drivers and people driving under
the influence of drugs or alcohol have dramatically higher accident rates.6 0 Manufacturers of identical automobiles might experience different fatality rates just because of differences in the
extent to which manufacturers attract particularly reckless
drivers. This Section empirically investigates the connection between teenage and under-the-influence driving and the elevated
fatality rates of manufacturers and states. But, in contrast to
the "miles driven" influence, we do not believe that innovation
sticks should be adjusted for reckless-driver influences. We
reach this conclusion because we believe that manufacturers
and states that have disproportionately reckless drivers are likely to be able to adopt cost-effective measures to deter the recklessness or mitigate the impact of recklessness.61
We begin our analysis by reporting the proportion of fatalities that come from accidents in which a teenage male was driving or in which the driver was under the influence of drugs or

60 Allan F. Williams has found that, in the year 2000, teenage males were roughly
twice as likely to be involved in a fatal crash as teenage females per licensed driver. Allan
F. Williams, Teenage Drivers: Patterns of Risk, 34 J Safety Rsrch 5, 6-7 (2003). The dangers of drunk driving are well documented. See, for example, Impaired Driving: Get the
Facts (CDC, Jan 13, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/BX4Z-3YQL (noting the CDC's
statistic that one-third of all traffic deaths are alcohol related).
61 See Part III.B in the main text.
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alcohol.62 Table 3A reports the five highest proportions by manufacturer and state.
TABLE 3A. HIGHEST MANUFACTURER AND STATE PROPORTIONS
OF TOTAL FATALITIES INVOLVING A TEENAGE-MALE DRIVER OR A
DRIVER UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS OR ALCOHOL

Percentage of
Fatal Accidents
Involving
Teenage Males

Percentage of
Fatal Accidents
Involving Drugs
or Alcohol (%)

Manufacturer

(0)

Manufacturer

Acura

16.3

BMW

26.1

Honda

11.9

Porsche

25.2

Mitsubishi
Pontiac

Audi
Jaguar

24.8
22.6

Audi

Saab

22.4

State

Percentage of
Fatal Accidents
Involving Drugs
or Alcohol (%)

Percentage of
Fatal Accidents
Involving
Teenage Males
State

NE
ID
RI
KS
UT

(0%)

10.8
10.0
9.7
9.6
9.5

SD
MT
WV
ND
WY

34.3
32.5
29.9
29.8
29.3

Table 3A reports that more than one-quarter (26.1 percent)
of fatal accidents involving a BMW occurred when the BMW
driver was under the influence and that more than one-third
(34.3 percent) of fatal accidents in South Dakota involved at
least one driver who was under the influence. These simple statistics might suggest guidelines for action. If South Dakota or

62 Teenage-male totals are calculated from sex and age variables in the FARS data
(age is between fourteen and twenty). Only drivers are considered. Drug and alcohol totals are calculated from the drug and alcohol flags ("drugs" and "drinking") in the FARS
data. If the "yes/no" alcohol or drug flag is missing in those data, we assume that drugs
and alcohol were not a factor in the accident.
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Montana wants to reduce fatalities in their states, taking action
against drunk driving might be an important place to start. But
a manufacturer or state might have a high fatality proportion
merely because it has been inordinately successful in reducing
other causes of fatalities. For example, BMW has the highest
manufacturer proportion of driving-under-the-influence fatalities, but it has a below-median fatality rate (as indicated by its
absence from the above-median analysis in Table 1A). If BMW
wants to reduce its fatalities further, it might want to consider
taking actions to deter or mitigate the impact of drug- and alcoholrelated driving. The evidence presented in Table 3A, however, is
not sufficient to establish that BMW has an above-median risk
of under-the-influence fatalities.
Table 4A responds to this concern by reporting the likelihood ratio of teenage-male fatality rates relative to the share of
a manufacturer's or state's cars more generally (that is, the proportion of drunk drivers involved in fatal accidents for a manufacturer or state divided by the proportion of nationally registered cars made by a manufacturer or in a state). Acura, for
example, is estimated to have a teenage-male likelihood ratio of
2.19, because Acura has a 0.84 percent share of registered cars
but a 1.84 percent share of fatal accidents in which a teenage
male was driving. Table 4A reports the ten highest and five lowest likelihood ratios for each of the four categories.
TABLE 4A. HIGHEST MANUFACTURER AND STATE LIKELIHOOD
RATIOS OF TOTAL FATALITIES INVOLVING A TEENAGE-MALE
DRIVER OR A DRIVER UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS OR
63
ALCOHOL

Manufacturer
Acura
Mitsubishi
Pontiac
Isuzu
Chevrolet

Likelihood
Ratio: Teenage
Males
2.19
2.12
1.75
1.35
1.29

Manufacturer
Mitsubishi
Pontiac
Isuzu
Chevrolet
GMC

Likelihood
Ratio: Drugs
or Alcohol
1.72
1.49
1.43
1.37
1.35

63 Likelihood ratios are the manufacturers' or states' proportions of drunk drivers
involved in fatal accidents divided by the proportion of nationally registered cars made
by that manufacturer or located in that state.
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Acura

1.26

GMC
Ford

1.11
1.10
1.09
1.06

Jeep
Ford
Nissan/Datsun
Infiniti

1.25
1.13
1.04
1.04

Jaguar

0.46

0.59

Cadillac
Mercedes-Benz

0.44
0.41

Saab
Volvo

0.41
0.39

Subaru
Buick
Saab
Suzuki
Volvo

State

Likelihood
Ratio: Teenage
Males

Jeep
Nissan/Datsun

MS
AR

2.50
1.75

SC

1.55
1.55

MO
NM

State

0.55
0.52
0.51
0.33
Likelihood
Ratio: Drugs
or Alcohol

WV
AR
MS

2.60
2.48
2.40

SC
MT

1.44

WY
NV
SD

2.32
2.25
1.99
1.95
1.83

1.42
1.41

NM
KS

1.80
1.66

0.66
0.65
0.64
0.56
0.51

MN
NY
NJ

0.56
0.47
0.45

RI

0.44
0.24

1.55
1.47
1.47

Unlike the Table 3A proportions, the Table 4A likelihood ratios are independent of how successful a manufacturer or state
is in reducing other types of fatalities. Hence, we see that some
manufacturers that were prominent in the Table 3A proportions
are absent from Table 4A's highest likelihood ratios. BMW had
the highest proportion of under-the-influence fatalities but has a
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likelihood ratio of only 0.83 (because while it has 0.96 percent of
registered vehicles, it generates only 0.79 percent of drivingunder-the-influence fatalities). Similarly, we see that Honda had
the second-highest proportion of teenage-male-driver fatalities
but has a likelihood ratio around 1 to 1.05. Overall, Honda is one
of the safer cars (as can also be seen by its absence from the
above-median analysis in Table 1A).
Stepping back, we see a strong positive correlation between
the manufacturers and states that have the highest fatality likelihood ratios for teenage-male and under-the-influence driving
and the manufacturers and states that have the highest totalfatality rates. Figure 1A plots the four scatter diagrams showing
the extent of these correlations.
FIGURE 1A. LIKELIHOOD RATIOS FOR TEENAGE-MALE AND
UNDER-THE-INFLUENCE DRIVING AND AVERAGE FATALITY RATES,
AT THE MANUFACTURER AND STATE LEVELS
Ratio
i

M
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The figures collectively show surprisingly tight positive linear correlations between the likelihood ratios and the totalfatality rates-with R-squared from univariate regressions ranging from 55.9 percent to 87.4 percent. These correlations may
well be driven by unaccounted-for common factors. For example,
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something else about Mississippi might cause it to have both a
higher alcohol-fatality likelihood ratio and a higher total-fatality
rate. Nonetheless, as discussed in Part III.B in the main text,
the figures suggest that above-median manufacturers and states
might reduce their total-fatality rates by taking action on teenage and under-the-influence driving.
The figures also suggest that variation in the under-theinfluence-driving risk is a more important influence than in the
teenage-driving risk with regard to variations in manufacturer
fatality rates, but that the teenage-driving risk is a more important influence than the under-the-influence-driving risk with
64
regard to variations in state fatality rates.
B.

An Alternative Method of Accounting for Overestimated
Fatalities

In Table 2 in the main text, we estimate how many lives
would have been saved annually on average if the proposed intervention succeeded at merely reducing the fatality rates of
above-median manufacturers down to the median industry rate.
We deflate our estimates for both the fatalities-over-median estimates and the costs by the number of single-counted fatalities
divided by the number of double-counted fatalities. This method
deflates every manufacturer by the same amount.
Double counting will result in manufacturers with larger
market shares having higher ratios of reported accidents to actual accidents than manufacturers with smaller market shares.
To understand why, consider the following stylized example of a
market with two manufacturers, Toyota and Ford:65 There are
eighty Toyotas and twenty Fords on the road. Drivers of each
make are equally likely to get in an accident. Assume that half
the cars for each make crash randomly into another car; there

64 This can be seen in Figure IA through the fact that, for manufacturers, the underthe-influence correlation is steeper and has a better fit than the teenage correlation,
while for states the teenage correlation is steeper and has a much better fit than we see
for the under-the-influence correlation. It might be that teenage males are more evenly
distributed across manufacturers because teens are more likely to drive whatever car
their parents drive. This might explain the slightly dampened correlation. In contrast,
many states have stringent teenage-driving laws that may affect accident rates directly
and cause a tighter correlation. Drunk drivers are much more likely to be driving certain
makes of cars, causing a close correlation between under-the-influence likelihood ratios
and total accident rates. The explanatory power of the likelihood ratio is nearly as high
at the state level (with an R 2 of 0.74 versus 0.79).
65 We thank the editors for proposing this example.
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are sixteen crashes between two Toyotas, eight crashes between
a Toyota and a Ford, and one crash between two Fords. For simplicity, assume that in each crash there are three fatalities: the
drivers of both cars, as well as one pedestrian. The actual number of fatalities is 3 * (16 + 8 + 1) = 75.
The reported total fatalities for Toyota is 120: 40 internal
fatalities, 40 external-in-vehicle fatalities (of which 32 were in
Toyotas and 8 were in Fords), and 40 pedestrians (1 fatality for
each accident involving a Toyota). The true number of fatalities
in accidents in which at least one Toyota was involved is
3 * (16 + 8) = 72, and the overreporting ratio for Toyotas is
120 / 72 = 1.667.
Similarly, the reported total fatalities for Ford is 30: 12 internal fatalities (8 from accidents with Toyotas and 4 from the
accident between 2 Ford drivers), 8 external-in-vehicle fatalities
(all from accidents with Toyotas), and 10 pedestrians (8 + 1 + 1).
The true number of fatalities in accidents involving a Ford is
3 * (8 + 1) = 27. The overreporting ratio for Fords is 30 / 27 =
1.111, considerably less than that for Toyota, the manufacturer
with a higher market share.
To address this, we calculate manufacturer-specific overreporting ratios from the actual crash data.66 The denominator
for each deflator is the sum of all double-counted total fatalities
for a manufacturer, which we have previously calculated. The
numerator is the sum of all single-counted deaths for the same
manufacturer. To do this, we attribute half of the internal
deaths to the manufacturer of the car involved and the remaining half of the internal deaths evenly to the other cars involved
in the accident. For example, if four cars were involved in an accident with one internal fatality, half of a fatality would be assigned to the manufacturer of the car in which the person died
and one-sixth of a fatality would be assigned to each of the three
other manufacturers. External-in-vehicle deaths are assigned
using the same rule. For pedestrian deaths, we distribute the fatalities equally-that is, if one pedestrian dies in a three-car accident involving cars of different makes, each manufacturer is
assigned one-third of a pedestrian fatality. We reproduce Table
2 using this deflator, finding that the estimates for fatalities

66 The estimates in Table 2 in the main text do this for the entire universe of crashes, dividing the number of actual deaths by the sum of all double-counted total fatalities.
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over median and for costs are greater than the deflated values
presented in Table 2 but less than the undeflated values.
TABLE 5A. OVER-MEDIAN ANALYSIS USING MANUFACTURER7
SPECIFIC DEFLATORS6

Total Fatalities

Fatalities
over Median
1445

Proportion of
Fatalities over
Median

(W)

Yearly Cost
of Fatalities
over Median
($ billion)
14.3

External Fatalities

67 This table presents results constructed using manufacturer-specific deflators to
account for the overreporting of fatalities.
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